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This case study has been prepared based on a real-life business scenario, where the 
company “Sociedade Central de Cervejas e Bebidas” (SCC) was chosen in order to serve as a 
teaching example of the complex and difficult task that companies’ have to expand their 
operations internationally, as well as, to alert to the opportunities and threats existing in a 
global business context. 
SCC is a Portuguese based company specialized in producing and marketing beer and 
other beverages, acquired in 2008 by the Heineken group, one of the largest beer companies 
in the world.  
In 2012 the entire European beer market was contracting considerably as a 
consequence of the global financial crisis and its negative impact on consumer’s purchasing 
power. In view of this critical situation, SCC managers believed that the only way the 
company could counteract to the poor results in Portugal was to focus their future 
development towards external markets. Thus, Angola and Brazil appeared to be the most 
meaningful internationalization options for SCC. In the former the company was urged to re-
evaluate its approach to the market and augment its performance, whilst in the latter SCC was 
not yet present and therefore needed to develop the appropriate strategy to enter that market. 
The case study presents some of the information SCC managers disposed at that time 
to make the most accurate possible decisions regarding the company’s next 
internationalization steps, with the main goals in mind of sustaining the Portuguese 
subsidiary’s infrastructures and contribute to Heineken’s global performance.   
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Chapters 
	  
1. Case Study 
1.1 Introduction 
It was the beginning of September 2012 when “Sociedade Central de Cervejas e Bebidas”1 
(SCC) was preparing itself for what could be a major step towards its international future.  
The beer market in Portugal, as well as in the rest of Europe, had been falling considerably 
during more than four years, as a consequence of the global financial crisis that had reduced the 
consumers’ purchasing power.  
With this scenario worsening day by day, SCC’s managers met with its partner Heineken, one 
of the most influent beer groups in the world, to decide what could the Portuguese company do in 
order to overcome this situation and also improve its contribution to the giant transnational company2. 
After this meeting an action plan was established, to expand and improve SCC’s presence in the 
developing beer markets, in harmony with Heineken’s goals and strategy. 
It soon became clear for the SCC management team what the next steps should be in order to 
achieve these goals:  (i) to revise the internationalization strategy in the growing Angolan market, to 
ensure the best performance in this important African country; (ii) and to enter the promising Brazilian 
market.  
Until the end of 2012, SCC managers had to present these internationalization projects to 
Heineken, who after this meeting would make the final decision about these plans.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
This case, even though based on a real scenario, was prepared as a basis for class discussion and not as an endorsement, or a 
source of primary data. Thus, some data has been disguised in order to preserve “Sociedade Central de Cervejas” 
confidentiality. 
	  
1 “Beer and Beverages Central Society” in English 
2 A Transnational company traditionally tries to combine the cost reduction benefits available through global integration 
together with the marketing advantages coming from local adequacy, taking this way advantage of the company’s central 
core capabilities and adapting it to a particular market and its own characteristics.  
 Source: Adapted from Barlett, Christopher A. (1986) “Building and Managing the Transnational: The New Organizational 
Challenge”, em Porter, Michael E. (ed.) Competition in Global Industries, Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business 
Scholl Press, pp.371-2. 
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1.2 SCC before Heineken 
The foundation of SCC was in 1934, 5 years after the severe global economic depression that 
had also significantly impacted the Portuguese economy and in particular the beer industry. These 
events put all the six Portuguese beer companies in a difficult situation, which led to four of them3 to 
merge in order to survive. This merge gave origin to “Sociedade Central de Cervejas”, and since that 
time this company has managed to maintain an important position in Portugal, as well as becoming a 
major exporter of Portuguese beer to the world. 
Besides producing and marketing beer, this company has extended its business to other areas, 
producing and selling bottled water and other beverages, which explains their name switch to 
“Sociedade Central de Cervejas e Bebidas, S.A.” later in 2004. 
Since its foundation this company has believed that innovation was crucial to maintain a 
sustainable competitive advantage. Improve quality and production capacity was the main goal in 
order to compete with the rest of the European companies and also to expand its international 
business. The first big strategic step towards this ideal consisted in the construction of a massive state-
of-art plant in Vialonga (see Exhibit	  1) (1968), considered the largest factory in Portugal at the time and 
still its main facility for the local market and exports.   
Innovation did not come only through improved facilities. It also assumed an important role in 
its marketing operations. This company has always had a pioneer position in this industry regarding 
marketing activities, by creating new brands and diversifying its portfolio, creating new product 
concepts, adopting new product and packaging technologies, and also by having an unparalleled 
approach to distribution and communication. Since the early 60’s SCC has given serious attention to 
these two marketing activities, which were seen as extremely important in this and key to outperform 
competition, matching demand with supply, surviving recessions and fostering customers’ loyalty. In 
this respect, SCC has created and managed its own distribution fleet to its selling points, and invested 
heavily in publicity, with creative advertising campaigns and sponsoring music and sporting events. 
In 2003, one of the leading European beer companies, Scottish & Newcastle (S&N) acquired 
100% of SCC’s capital stock4. In 2007, the third largest group in the global beer industry, Heineken 
International, and its closest competitor, and fourth in the world, Carlsberg, had formed a consortium 
with the single purpose of buying the S&N group. In 2008, these two companies decided to end the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
3	  The	  companies	  were:	  “Companhia	  Produtora	  de	  Malte	  e	  Cerveja	  Portugalia”,	  “Companhia	  de	  Cerveja	  Estrela”,	  
“Companhia	  da	  Fabrica	  de	  Cerveja	  Jansen”,	  “Companhia	  de	  Cervejas	  de	  Coimbra”	  
4	  “Centra	  de	  Cervejas	  e	  Bebidas”	  history.	  Available	  at:	  http://www.centralcervejas.pt[Accessed	  10	  November	  2012]	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agreement and the assets of the recently acquired group were consequently split. On the 29th of April 
that same year, Heineken International was officially given the ownership of SCC. 
1.3 SCC after Heineken 
Heineken International 
Heineken International, considered the 3rd largest group within the beer industry, inherited its 
name from its first and original beer brand Heineken. This company emerged in Amsterdam, almost 
150 years ago (1864), producing and selling its exclusive premium beer brand. The Heineken 
Company initiated its international story, in 1933, exporting its beer to the United States, and later in 
1937 began brewing abroad. After these first steps towards internationalization, Heineken continued 
its expansion through growth and a series of acquisition processes in Western Europe, Africa, and 
Central/Eastern Europe respectively. The last big development was in 2010, through an agreement 
with the largest beverage company of Mexico and Latin America “Fomento Económico Mexicano, 
S.A.B. de C.V.”5 (FEMSA), which let Heineken to take better advantage of the emerging markets in 
Latin America and consolidate its performance in North and Central America.  
Heineken prided itself, not only on its “most global beer brand in the world” claim, but also on 
its extensive international reach, with a comprehensive portfolio of beer brands being sold in more 
than 178 countries, and plants operating in a total of 716 (see Exhibit	  2, and Exhibit	  3). As stated in 
Heineken’s international website: “Wherever you are in the world, you are able to enjoy one of our 
brands. We own, market and sell more than 250 of them. Our principal global brand is Heineken®, the 
world’s most valuable international premium beer brand.“ 
The company’s goals had always put a lot of emphasis on the premium brand Heineken. 
However, local brands started to gain a more significant attention by representing around 80% of the 
group’s total business volume, against Heineken’s 20%7. The main strategy was kept constant: to build 
a strong portfolio of brands in the chosen markets, by combining the true power of local brands 
together with the international brands, sustaining the Heineken brand at the top. A centralized 
coordination of all beer brands’ management, distribution and coverage, and also the provision of 
support to all local management teams scattered around the globe, made possible for this group to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
5	  In	  January	  2010,	  Heineken	  International	  announced	  its	  intention	  of	  acquiring	  FEMSA’s	  beer	  operations.	  This	  
transaction	  did	  not	  involve	  cash,	  Heineken	  paid	  FEMSA	  with	  shares.	  With	  this	  FEMSA	  became	  a	  major	  shareholder	  
of	  Heineken	  (just	  after	  the	  Heineken	  family)	  with	  20%	  of	  the	  shares.	  Source:	  Wikipedia.	  Available	  at:	  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FEMSA	  [Accessed	  22	  November	  2012]	  
6	  Heineken	  international	  information.	  Available	  at:	  
http://www.heinekeninternational.com/companystrategyprofile.aspx[Accessed	  20	  October	  2012]	  
7	  Information	  acquired	  through	  an	  interviewing	  process	  realized	  at	  “Central	  de	  Cervejas	  e	  Bebidas”	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successfully implement its strategy of growth. To accomplish its strategy Heineken has established 
five global business priorities, 1) to grow the Heineken® brand, 2) to be consumer-inspired, customer-
oriented, and brand-led, 3) to capture the opportunities in emerging markets, 4) to leverage the 
benefits of HEINEKEN’s global scale, 5) to drive personal leadership. 
SCC and Heineken relationship 
After becoming 100% owned by the Heineken group, SCC was able to maintain a significant 
management empowerment, thus continuing to function in the same way as before the ownership 
change. Local expertise was extremely valued by Heineken, whose had also provided managerial 
support to the original Portuguese company and had created operational synergies. SCC was 
effectively aligned with Heineken’s goals and ambitions, making it easy to sustain a supportive and 
friendly relationship between both companies.  
Exports accounted for 20% of SCC’s total sales in 2011, of which 70% came from the 
“PALOP”8 countries and 30% from other countries such as, Switzerland, France, England, Germany, 
Luxembourg, USA, Canada, and Australia9. Within the “PALOP” countries, 95% of the export 
business came from Angola and the remaining 5% came from Mozambique10, Cape Verde, and São 
Tomé and Príncipe. 
1.4 SCC’s Brand portfolio 
The SCC had already at this time a fairly comprehensive portfolio of beer brands and other 
beverages, dominated by its own national brands, along with other international ones (see Exhibit	  4). 
This company possessed several brands with a great Portuguese expression such as, the mineral water 
brand “Luso”11, and the beer brand “Sagres”12, connected with the Portuguese discoveries and history, 
the nation’s shield, and the national flag colors. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
8“Países	  Africanos	  de	  Língua	  Oficial	  Portuguesa”	  –	  Acronym	  for	  Portuguese	  Speaking	  African	  Countries	  
9	  Information	  acquired	  through	  an	  interviewing	  process	  realized	  at	  “Central	  de	  Cervejas	  e	  Bebidas”	  
10	  In	  2012,	  Mozambique	  was	  still	  very	  poor	  and	  dominated	  by	  South	  African	  beer	  companies	  
11	  “Luso”	  is	  a	  prefix	  used	  to	  identify	  its	  Portuguese	  origin	  
12	  Has	  no	  translation	  to	  English	  or	  any	  other	  language	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1.5 The “Sagres” Brand 
The SCC’s core beer brand was unquestionably Sagres, in both national and international 
markets, and exporting was part of its history since the very beginning (see Exhibit	  5). This brand was 
created in 1940 with the single purpose of being exported. It started being sold in Gibraltar in response 
to a request of the British Allied Forces that were protecting the North Africa from the Nazis’ entry 
attempts, and was followed by the Azores archipelago and all the other Portuguese overseas territories, 
Angola being one of them. The company had the opportunity to take advantage of favorable 
circumstances Portugal was facing at the time, such as, the neutral position during the World War II 
that gave Portugal a really significant competitive advantage, and also the Portuguese World 
Exposition that was successfully running at that time. The great success this beer had, rapidly led to its 
establishment in the Portuguese territory as a national beer brand. Sagres was positioned as a 
mainstream brand within the national market, although in some external markets, such as Angola, it 
had assumed a premium beer position. 
1.6 The World Beer market 
In 2012, the beer industry as was the case of many other industries was looking for future 
developments in the emerging markets, such as, Asia, Latin America, and Russia, and also to the 
African markets13. The global scenario for this specific industry was as follows: Europe markets were 
declining, except for Eastern Europe (Russia) that was growing; USA was stable; Latin America, Asia, 
Africa and Middle East were the developing markets at that time. (see Exhibit	  6 and Exhibit	  8) 
This industry was dominated by some huge transnational groups, which kept growing through 
a series of mergers and alliances, enlarging and consolidating their operations allover the world. In 
2010, the four leading groups together, Anheuser-Bush InBev, SABMiller, Heineken and Carlsberg, 
already held 43% of the global market. (see Exhibit	  7) Such as M&A14, there were other trends in the 
global beer industry, such as, the increasing market’s segmentation, generating a higher level of 
product’s differentiation, constantly bringing new product concepts and technologies to the markets, 
and also the super-premium and premium segments that were considerably growing. Moreover, 
regarding internationalization in this industry, protectionism was substantially gaining attention in the 
emerging economies and also in other potential developing ones, posing this way a certain barrier to 
imported beer brands. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
13	  Report	  Linker,	  2011.	  Beer	  Industry:	  Market	  Research	  Reports,	  Statistics	  and	  Analysis.	  Available	  at:	  
http://www.reportlinker.com/ci02015/Beer.html	  [Accessed	  16	  October	  2012]	  
14	  Acronym	  for	  “Mergers	  and	  Acquisitions”	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1.7 The Portuguese Beer Market 
The Portuguese beer market could be characterized as a Duopoly, since it had been dominated 
by two companies until this time. These two companies, Unicer15 and SCC, had experienced a tough 
but friendly competition for several years, not only in the Portuguese market but also abroad. SCC 
assumed the leadership in 200816 and managed to maintain its position until 2012.  Although in this 
year, and even after a productive summer season, this company found itself roughly behind its primary 
competitor with a market share of 47,1% against one of 47,5% (see Exhibit	  9, and	  Exhibit	  10). During 
the last decades, SCC and Unicer, backed by two of the biggest groups in the global beer industry 
(Heineken and Carlsberg respectively), had demonstrated great levels of expertise in marketing and 
innovation, defending that these two activities were critical to succeed in the beer industry. 
The Portuguese market was experiencing in 2012 a challenging recession that not only 
affected the beer industry but the entire consumer’s “share-of-throat”17 , due to a decrease in 
consumers’ purchasing power that resulted from the global financial crisis. This setting made the 
consumption per capita in Portugal to go down and caused the market volume to drop 10,6% in 2012 
(see Exhibit	  11). These events made SCC fear for its business success and infrastructure sustainability, 
because the majority of its markets were experimenting a contraction of sales18. 
1.8 Organizational and International Objectives 
With the national market declining, SCC had to rely on overseas markets in order to maintain 
volumes and make an effort to continue progressing, to achieve business targets and ensure the 
infrastructure’s sustainability. The main purpose of exports was to compensate volume rather than 
profits, having in mind that the margins attainable in the national market were higher than those of the 
exports19. The main locations to expand operations appeared to be the ones with a certain connection 
to the country, such as, the “PALOP” countries, the former Portuguese colonies, and the countries 
where it was possible to locate Portuguese diaspora.  
SCC internationalization initiatives and its dream of making Sagres brand the most imported 
Portuguese beer brand in the world, as the former SCC’s CEO Alberto da Ponte had stated, were also 
in line with Heineken goals of creating a strong portfolio of local brands and consolidating its status as 
one of the most international beer groups in the world. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
15	  “Unicer”	  is	  a	  Portuguese	  based	  company	  specialized	  in	  producing	  and	  marketing	  beer,	  water,	  and	  other	  beverages.	  
16	  Information	  acquired	  through	  an	  interviewing	  process	  realized	  at	  “Central	  de	  Cervejas	  e	  Bebidas”	  
17	  “Share-­‐of-­‐Throat”	  stands	  for	  the	  amount	  of	  liquid	  products	  consumed	  by	  people.	  
18 The majority of markets were in Europe, such as, Spain, France, Switzerland, Germany, England and others 
19	  Information	  acquired	  through	  an	  interviewing	  process	  realized	  at	  “Central	  de	  Cervejas	  e	  Bebidas”	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1.9 The potential of the Angolan market 
Despite all the poverty, inflation, inequality, corruption, a low result on Human Development 
Index (HDI) and Economic Freedom index (EFI), and other (see Exhibit	  12,	  Exhibit	  13,	  Exhibit	  14, and 
Exhibit	  15), during the last few decades Angola was attracting high volumes of business and rising its 
influence in Southern Africa, establishing well its position as one of the most important emerging 
countries in the world, in 2012. 
The beer market in Angola was perceived to be one of the most promising of Africa, not only 
having in mind the size of the population and the beer consumption habits in this country, but also its 
past performance and expected development, with a market growth around 40% each year20. 
The most famous and successful beer in Angola was by far the local brand “Cuca” with 48% 
market share, managed by the local group “Companhia União de Cervejas de Angola” (CUCA)21. This 
same group also held some other brands with a good performance, such as, the Angolan 
“Nocal”(16%), “Eka”(4,8%) and “N’gola”(10%), and the international brand “33Export” and some 
others (see Exhibit	  16). Unicer was present in this market with two premium brands, “Cristal” and 
“Super Bock”, while SCC had “Sagres” as a premium brand and has introduced “Cergal” as a value 
brand to fight against “Cuca” (see Exhibit	  17). In Angola, contrary to the Portuguese market, Unicer 
was leading essentially through its brand “Cristal” that was the most appreciated imported beer in 
Angola, mainly due to its light body and taste. Although, SCC managed to stay close behind, with its 
brand Sagres that had seen its sales almost double in 2011. 
Beer consumption in Angola was around 9 million hectoliters, with 7,5 million being Angolan 
beers and the remaining 1,5 million being imported brands(see Exhibit	  18). Regarding consumption per 
capita in Angola, the consumption patterns were not known by consumer segment. However, Dr. 
Nuno Pinto Magalhães, SCC’s Board Adviser for Corporate Affairs and Ombudsman, believed that 
the regular beer consumers in Angola had considerably higher per capita consumption.  
Concerning the distribution pipeline in Angola, it worked in a completely different way to 
Europe. Beer was firstly sold to huge warehouses by the local or foreign beer factories, and then, all 
intermediaries or even final consumers had to go into these warehouses to buy the beer they wanted. 
The great majority of beer was packed in glass bottles, even though it was also possible to find a few 
brands using aluminium cans. Without having done extensive market research, SCC managers knew 
from experience that the attributes the majority of Angolan beer consumers valued the most were 
freshness and light taste. In fact, the 80% referring to national brands was mainly driven by a younger 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
20	  Information	  acquired	  through	  an	  interviewing	  process	  realized	  at	  “Central	  de	  Cervejas	  e	  Bebidas”	  
21	  “Angolan	  Beer	  Union	  Company”	  in	  English	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type of consumer, with a lower budget and seeking the attributes mentioned above. The remaining 
20%, represented by imported beers, was driven by another type of consumer: older, healthier, with a 
need for status that was achievable through imported goods. 
SCC history in Angola 
SCC started its investments in Angola in 1947 by being part of CUCA’s creation right after 
the Second World War, and also by starting to export Sagres to the country a few years later. After its 
introduction, Sagres rapidly gained notoriety among Angolan beer consumers and assumed the leading 
position in the Angolan beer market as a premium imported beer. The increasing demand and success 
achieved by this brand finally supported SCC’s decision, in 200422, to start producing Sagres in the 
Angolan territory, more specifically in “Cuca’s” factories. Although, surprisingly after this moment, 
the Angolans started to reject the Portuguese brand for some reason and its sales started to fell 
considerably. What indeed happened was that Cuca had strategically taken advantage of the situation 
to convey to consumers that since both beers were done in the same place, both products were the 
same, and so, there was no difference in quality. This in fact, affected the way Sagres was perceived in 
Angola and forced, one or two years later, SCC to re-start importing its beer. 
This definitely represented a turning point in the Angolan beer market. By 2005, the “Cuca” 
brand had assumed a dominant leading position with a market share around 50%. Also Unicer had 
improved its performance maintaining its “Super Bock” brand as an imported one and launching the 
“Cristal” brand, which achieved a solid place in the Angolan market because of its lightness and 
smooth taste. 
Since then SCC has been making significant efforts in order to reach its former position in this 
market, mostly by sustaining innovation and with the introduction of the “Cergal” brand, also a lighter 
and smoother-tasting beer. One of the main innovations was the re-introduction of “mini”23, which had 
already been tried back in 1972 but without having the expected outcome. Although, after releasing 
again this packaging model a few years later, it finally proved to be a huge success due to its ability to 
keep beer fresh longer in a warm country such as Angola. This has undoubtedly boosted SCC’s 
performance, contributing to a big share of the group’s sales, and soon being copied by its competitor 
Unicer (see Exhibit	  19). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
22	  Angonotícias,	  2004.	  Angola	  já	  produz	  cerveja	  de	  marca	  Sagres.	  Available	  at:	  
http://www.angonoticias.com/Artigos/item/652	  [Accessed	  16	  October	  2012]	  
23	  “Mini”	  is	  a	  innovative	  packaging	  concept	  that	  consists	  in	  a	  smaller	  glass	  beer	  bottle,	  with	  25centiliters,	  which	  allows	  
beer	  to	  be	  consumed	  while	  it	  is	  still	  fresh	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Internationalization strategy challenges and alternatives 
In Angola the scenario is of a market continuously developing and strong national companies 
with a production capacity close to the beer consumption of the country, but also prevalent was a 
noteworthy threat: the increase of import tariffs. This happened at a critical time when some of these 
importing companies had to deal with a severe national financial crisis in Portugal, making them more 
dependent on exports. 
Angolan beer producers, which had already made great investments in this industry and in 
their country, were pressuring the government to protect the market and impose more barriers on 
imports. The import duties were supposed to rise from 30% to 50% in 2012, but fortunately for the 
Portuguese companies the prime minister of Portugal at the time was able to delay that decision after 
making an official appeal to the Angolan government, to take into consideration the difficult situation 
the Portuguese economy was facing at this time. For both SCC and the country’s economic welfare it 
was more important to continue exporting rather than starting to produce in Africa. Exports were 
sustaining the company’s infrastructures and personnel by compensating the downturn observed in 
Portugal. In fact, this market has proved to be very important for the Portuguese beer companies, as 
the Angolan market represented a major share of their exports and around 20% of the SCC’s total 
sales24. At the same time, Angolan authorities were starting to yield the pressures of national 
producers, wanting foreign companies to make direct investments in the country and produce locally.  
Due to this, SCC was seeing itself forced to consider whether it should continue to export or 
to build its own production plants in Africa. In case it is chosen to continue exporting, whether they 
should pass on the import duties on the prices, or absorb it in their own margins. On the other hand, if 
they started producing in Africa, should they create a new brand or should they produce Sagres and 
risk spoiling the consumers’ perceptions about its superior quality due to it being imported, as had 
happened before. 
Moreover, there were other risks in Angola that could possibly make this decision even more 
complex and slower than usual. Investments made in Angola were known to bare a high level of risk 
and so they had to be done with strict and carefully planned criteria. Adding to this, Angola was also 
known to have great political instability, high corruption levels, and there was also the problem of 
national idiosyncrasies25 prevailing in the African continent. A good example of this was the relation 
between Angola and South Africa. Cooperation between these countries and their respective producers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
24	  Information	  acquired	  through	  an	  interviewing	  process	  realized	  at	  “Central	  de	  Cervejas	  e	  Bebidas”	  
25	  Idiosyncrasies meant that relations between African countries were often difficult and crooked, mainly because they were 
competing for greater territorial influence in Southern Africa. 	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was tortuous and nearly impossible to achieve. As Dr.Nuno Pinto Magalhães, based on his experience, 
affirmed that: “In Africa, each case needs to be considered individually.”  
There were also some challenges in the distribution stage, such as, the poor infrastructures on 
offer; roads only covered a limited area; and the prevailing insecurity in the country. 
1.10 The Promising Brazilian Market 
In 2012, Brazil, with a population of 193,3 millions and a GDP per capita of 11.239$, was 
ranked the 3rd largest producer of beer in the world (see Exhibit 6,	  Exhibit	  14, and Exhibit	  15). There was 
no doubt about the great economical potentiality Brazil had achieved, being considered one of the 
most important developing countries in the world that was forecasted to grow substantially in the near 
future. In this country beer consumption per capita was around 65 liters (see Exhibit 8), and the overall 
beer market was expected to grow considerably in size and in profitability due to various reasons. 
Firstly, the super-premium and premium sector only represented around 5% of the market, 
compared to 15% in Europe26. These numbers were about to change, due to the increased consumer 
purchasing power27, economic stability and the emerging consumers’ desire of trying new tastes and 
concepts28. There was already evidence of a growth of 15% in in the premium segments, which would 
increase this market to the same level as in Europe, between 5 to 10 years maximum. There were also 
two huge sporting events coming to Brazil, the 2014 FIFA29 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic games, 
which would certainly have a significant impact on beer consumption in the country. 
Secondly, in this market consumers were showing a high degree of interest in new beer brands 
and concepts, leading international companies to grow faster than the market in general. 
Although, at the same time, these factors were also driving the market to a higher degree of 
segmentation, giving space to a large number of microbreweries to progress, and differentiation to 
gain a greater focus through product quality, level of service provided, marketing strategies and 
management efficiency. Another important aspect was that the Brazilian market was still very 
protected, during this phase of fast development. The Brazilian tax structure was indeed quite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
26	  Época Negócios, 2011. Mercado De Cerveja Caminha Para A Maior Segmentação. Available at: 
http://epocanegocios.globo.com/Revista/Common/0,,EMI280971-16355,00-
mercado+de+cerveja+caminha+para+a+maior+segmentacao.html  [Accessed 16 October 2012] 
27	  Cervesia,	  2011.	  O Mercado Cervejeiro Brasileiro Atual – Potencial De Crescimento. Available at: 
http://www.cervesia.com.br/dados-estatisticos/760-o-mercado-cervejeiro-brasileiro-atual-potencial-de-crescimento.html 
[Accessed	  16	  October	  2012]	  
28	  Ibid.	  
29	  Acronym	  for	  “Fédération	  Internationale	  de	  Football	  Association”	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confusing, making it very difficult to estimate the exact final cost of imports30. Even though, SCC 
managers believed that the entire amount of imports taxes at this time was certainly above 150%. 
The Brazilian market was largely dominated by the biggest group in this industry, AB-imbev, 
with almost 70% market share. While the second and third places, were being disputed by the 
Brazilian company “Grupo Petrópolis”31 and Kirin Holdings32. The Heineken company after its 
agreement with FEMSA had reached the fourth place, staying really close to the two previous ones 
with 8,5% market share. This market was indeed gaining more attention from this group, which 
became alerted to its potential and soon started to grow above the market average (see Exhibit 20 and 
Exhibit 21). 
Heineken Brazil 
Heineken entered in the Brazilian market, in 2010, after acquiring FEMSA’s beer sector. With 
this, the company found itself with a total production capacity of 20 million hectoliters per year33. The 
headquarters were in São Paulo and a total of eight brewing plants, in seven different states, were 
already operating in this country. With this acquisition, Heineken was also able to enter the Brazilian 
market with a quite solid and efficient brand portfolio (see Exhibit 22).  
At this stage the company’s brand was already known to the Brazilian public, by being present 
in several activities related with music and sports. It was usually a sponsor of massive music events 
such as, Rock in Rio, and was already known as a major sponsor of huge sporting events all over the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
30	  To calculate the total cost three taxes had to be considered: the Import Duty (II); the Industrialized Product tax (IPI); the 
Merchandise and Service Circulation tax (ICMS); and other smaller taxes and duties.	  
31	  Known	  before	  by	  “Cervejaria	  Petrópolis”,	  produces	  some	  renown	  beer	  brands	  in	  brazil,	  such	  as,	  “Itaipava”,	  “Crystal”	  
and	  “Petra”	  
32	  Kirin	  Holdings	  is	  a	  big	  Japanese	  Beer	  Group	  that	  had recently acquired a famous Brazilian company “Schincariol”.	  
33	  Heineken	  Brazil	  information.	  Available	  at:	  http://www.heinekenbrasil.com.br/?heineken-­‐no-­‐brasil	  [Accessed	  20	  
October	  2012]	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Internationalization strategy challenges and alternatives 
The beer brand Sagres had already at this time some notoriety in Brazil among the sizeable 
first and second generation of Portuguese families residing in this country and also between the most 
recent wave of qualified Portuguese workers whom went to live in Brazil searching for better live 
opportunities. Having in mind that there were still no exports to this place, the opportunity to get just a 
niche segment in this huge market would be of great impact on SCC’s financial performance. As all 
SCC’s managers share the opinion that: “Anything that is sold in that world is indeed very important 
to us.” 
So here, the SCC’s main goal while entering this new promising market was to target, conquer 
and sustain this significant Portuguese community and people with Portuguese influence living in 
Brazil. In order to accomplish this, the Portuguese company’s managers came up with two distinct 
alternatives: the first one was to start exporting Sagres to Brazil, and the second was to grab the 
opportunity and take advantage of the Heineken’s production and/or distribution infrastructures 
already established in this country.  
Looking into the second alternative, there was only one imperative issue for SCC to consider, 
which was to negotiate with its shareholder Heineken, the portfolio and production capacity 
management. It was absolutely necessary to examine if there was enough room to produce this new 
brand and also if it could suit in the existing distribution pipeline. SCC had to make sure that supply 
could match demand, that the Sagres brand could be harmoniously incorporated within the existing 
portfolio, that the route to market was controlled, and lastly to decide the best time to launch the 
product. 
1.11 Markets’ Expected Output Comparison 
Each of these markets presented their own potentialities and hurdles, as well as SCC that also 
held different reasons to approach each one of them. Both these markets seemed to be able to offer 
remarkable opportunities for SCC and Heineken by showing enough space to grow and the capability 
to fulfill both companies’ goals: to guarantee a favorable stake in the Angolan market and to derive 
some profits in the Brazilian one. It was dependent on the way SCC tackled the markets and the 
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1.12 Conclusion 
Reaching this point, it was clear for SCC managers that expanding and participating in the 
Angolan market had actually been key to accomplish its goals and alleviate the serious condition it 
was seeing itself at the time. Exports made possible to compensate what was being lost in the national 
and European markets in terms of volume. However, with the Angolan government’s threat of 
increasing tariffs, SCC had to review its way of approaching this important market. The main 
questions here were: 
• Would it still be reasonable to believe in producing Sagres in Angola or should this brand remain 
being an “imported” brand? In this case, where should tariffs’ increase be reflected?  
• What other options could SCC have to enhance its performance and influence in the Angolan beer 
market?  
At the same time, SCC had also realized about the opportunity to expand its operations in the 
immense Brazilian market, consolidating its sustainability in terms of profits, not in terms of volume, 
as in Angola. The remaining issue was: 
• Having in mind the company’s objectives in this market, what internationalization strategy would 
be more suitable in this case? 
It was already mid December and the day SCC was going to meet with its partner was really 
close. The persons in charge for this task were quite confident about their decisions. They were aware 
of all possible outcomes that each scenario could bring. However, they were still missing at this point 
the consumer research results, relying only in the opinion of their local partners. They believed that 
key local opinion and insights were crucial to get the most accurate and real perspective about their 
projects. 
It was definitely a short period of time, full of challenging decisions and commitments, in 
which SCC managers had to go beyond frontiers and find the ultimate answers for the company’s 
future sustainability and success. It was time for Heineken representatives to see the outcomes of this 
research and assessment period so the plan could be finally put into action.	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Source: Case writer 
 
 
Exhibit 2 – Heineken International’s geographic distribution of consolidated beer volume in thousands 
hectoliters, FY 2011 
 
!"## !"#" $
Western Europe 45,4 45,4 0
Central & Eastern Europe 45,4 42,4 +7.4
Americas 22 19,1 +16.0
Africa & Middle East 50,5 37,9 +30.0
Asia Pacific 1,5 1,3 -1.5
Consolidated beer volume 164,6 145,9 +13.0 	  












	   15	  
Exhibit 3 – Heineken’s breweries in the world, 2012 
	  
!"#$%&' !"()*$' +",*%-"$ .&*$/0
Brau Union Österreich (100%) Leoben, Graz, Schladming, Heineken, Zipfer, Gösser, Puntigamer,
Schwechat, Wieselburg, Zipf, 
Linz, Desperados, Edelweiss, Schlossgold, Kaiser,
Hallein Schwechater, Wieselburger, Reininghaus, Schladminger
HEINEKEN Breweries (100%) Bobruysk 
Rechitsapivo (96.2%) Rechitsa
Bulgaria Zagorka Brewery (49.4%) Stara Zagora
Heineken, Zagorka, Desperados, Ariana, Amstel, Stolichno, 
Starobrno, Kaiser
Croatia Karlovacka Pivovara (100%) Karlovac Heineken, Karlovacko, Desperados, Edelweiss
Czech 
Republic
HEINEKEN Ceská Republika 
(100%)
Kru!ovice, Brno, Velke 
Brezno, Krasne Brezno
Heineken, Kru!ovice, Starobrno, Zlatopramen, Breznak, Frij, Zlaty 
Bazant, Hostan, Cerveny Dark, Baron Trenck
Paulaner Brauerei (25%) München Paulaner Weissbier, Paulaner, Hacker-Pschorr,Thurn & Taxis
AuerBräu (25%) Rosenheim Auer
Weissbierbrauerei Hopf (25%) Miesbach Hopf Weisse
Kulmbacher Brauerei (31.4%) Kulmbach Kulmbacher, Mönchshof, EKU, Kapuziner
Sternquell Brauerei (31.4%) Plauen Sternquell
Braustolz (31.4%) Chemnitz Braustolz
Scherdel (31.4%) Hof Scherdel








Greece Athenian Brewery (98.8%) Athens, Patras, Thessaloniki, 
Lamia
Heineken, Amstel, Alfa, Fischer, Sol, Buckler, McFarland, 
Murphy’s Irish Stout, BIOS 5, IOLI
Hungary HEINEKEN Hungaria (100%) Martfü, Sopron Heineken, Gösser, Soproni Aszok, Amstel, Kaiser, Zlaty Bazant, 
Edelweiss, Schlossgold, Steffl, Adambrau, Buckler
Kazakhstan Efes Karaganda (28%) Almaty, Karaganda Heineken, Tian Shan, Efes, Beliy Medved, Stary Melnik, Sokol, 
Gold Mine
Macedonia Pivara Skopje (48.2%) Skopje Heineken, Amstel, Skopsko, Gorsko
Poland Grupa Zywiec (61.9%)
Cieszyn, Elblag, Lezajsk, 
Warka, Zywiec
Heineken, Desperados, Zywiec, Warka, Tatra, Strong, Special, 
Królewskie, Lezajsk
Romania HEINEKEN Romania (98.4%)
Constanta, Craiova, 
Miercurea Ciuc, Targu Mures
Heineken, Ciuc, GoldenBrau, Silva, Bucegi, Neumarkt, Gambrinus, 
Horgita, Hatigana, Desperados, Edelweiss






Heineken, Amstel, Bochkarev, Ochota, Zlaty Bazant, Guinness, 
Buckler, Stepan Razin, PIT, Edelweiss, Doctor Diesel, Tri 
Medvedya, Gösser, Amur-Pivo, Zhigulevskoye, Patra, Strelets, 
Bereg Baikala, Okskoye, Rusich, Volnaya Sibir, Sedoy Ural, 
Shikhan, Ostmark, Kenigsberg
United Serbian Breweries (72%) Novi Sad Heineken, MB, Master, Amstel
United Serbian Breweries 
Zajecarsko (52.5%)
Zajecar PilsPlus, Efes, Zajecarsko
Slovakia HEINEKEN Slovensko (100%) Hurbanovo Heineken, Zlaty Bazant, Corgon, Kelt, Starobrno, Gemer, Martiner
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Belgium Alken-Maes (99.9%) Alken, Kobbegem, Opwijk Maes, Grimbergen, Cristal, Mort Subite, Ciney, Affligem, Judas, Hapkin, Brugs, Postel, Desperados, Heineken
Finland Hartwall (100%) Lathi, Karijoki Lapin Kulta, Karjala, Foster’s, Heineken, 1836 Classic Gourmet, Jaffa, Pepsi, Novelle, Original Long Drink, Upcider
France HEINEKEN France         (100%)
Marseille, Mons-en-
Baroeul, Schiltigheim
Heineken, Pelforth, Desperados, Affligem, Fischer tradition, ‘33’ 
Export, Panach’, Adelscott, Amstel, Georges Killians, Murphy’s Irish 
Stout
Ireland HEINEKEN Ireland         (100%) Cork
Heineken, Amstel, Coors Light, Desperados,Tiger, Sol, Murphy’s Irish 
Stout, Beamish Stout, Foster’s, Paulaner, Birra Moretti, Zywiec, 
Affligem
Italy HEINEKEN Italia           (100%)




Birra Moretti, Heineken, Dreher, Ichnusa, Classica von Wunster, Birra 
Messina, Prinz Brau, Sans Souci, Amstel, Fischer, Strongbow




Heineken, Amstel, Wieckse Witte, Jillz, Strongbow, Desperados, 
Lingen’s Blond, Murphy’s Irish Red
Brand Bierbrouwerij        
(100%) Wijlre Brand
Vrumona (100%) Bunnik Crystal Clear, Royal Club, Sisi, Sourcy, Vitamin Water, Pepsi, 7-Up, Rivella
Portugal Sociedade Central de Cervejas e Bebidas (98.7%) Vialonga, Luso, Cruzeiro
Sagres, Luso, Cruzeiro, Cergal, Imperial, Heineken, Foster’s, Jansen, 
São Jorge, Bulmer
Spain HEINEKEN España        (98.7%)
Seville, Madrid, Valencia, 
Jaen
Cruzcampo, Amstel, Heineken, Shandy, Paulaner, Guinness, Latino, 
Foster’s, Legado de Yuste, Maes, John Smith, Judas, Mort Subite, 
Newcastle
Switzerland HEINEKEN Switzerland (100%) Chur, Lucerne
Heineken, Eichhof, Calanda, Desperados, Ittinger, Haldengut, 
Ziegelhof, Erdinger, Clausthaler, Amstel




Foster’s, Strongbow, John Smith’s, Kronenbourg, Bulmers, Heineken, 
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Argentina Companias Cervecerías     Unidas Argentina (33.1%)
Salta, Santa Fe,               
Lujan
Heineken, Budweiser, Paulaner, Birra Moretti, Guinness, Corona, 
Negra Modelo, Salta, Santa Fe, Cordoba, Kunstmann, Palermo, 
Biecker, Schneider, Imperial, Otro Mundo
Bahamas Commonwealth Brewery (75%) Nassau Heineken, Guinness, Kalik, Vitamalt
Brazil Cervejarias Kaiser            (100%)
Araraquara, Cuibabá, Feira 
de Santana, Gravataí, Jacareí, 
Manaus, Pacatuba, Ponta 
Grossa
Kaiser, Bavaria, Sol, Summer Draft, Gold, Heineken, Kaiser Bock, 
Xingú, Dos Equis, Amstel Pulse, Birra Moretti, Edelweiss, 
Murphy’s, Santa Cerva
Chile Companias Cervecerías      Unidas (33.1%)
Antofagasta, Santiago, 
Temuco Heineken, Cristal, Escudo, Royal, Kunstmann




Dominicana (9.3%) Santo Domingo Presidente
Haiti Brasserie Nationale           d’Haïti (22.5%) Port-au-Prince Guinness, Malta, Prestige
Jamaica Desnoes & Geddes (15.5%) Kingston Heineken, Dragon Stout, Guinness, Red Stripe
Martinique Brasserie Lorraine (100%) Lamentin Heineken, Lorraine, Malta, Porter
Mexico Cervecería Cuauhtémoc Moctezuma (100%)
Monterrey, Tecate, Orizaba, 
Guadalajara, Toluca, Navojoa
Tecate, Sol, Dos Equis, Bohemia, Coors Light, Indio, Carta Blanca, 
Superior, Kloster, Noche Buena, Soul Citric
Nicaragua Consorcio Cervecero Centroamericano (12.5%) Managua Heineken, Bufalo, Tona, Victoria
Panama Cervecerías Barú-Panama (74.9%) Panama City Heineken, Crystal, Guinness, Panama, Soberana, Budweiser
St. Lucia Windward & Leeward     Brewery (72.7%) Vieux-Fort Heineken, Guinness, Piton
Suriname Surinaamse Brouwerij     (76.2%) Paramaribo Heineken, Parbo
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Algeria Tango (100%) Algiers Tango, Samba, Fiesta, Heineken, Amstel
Burundi Brarudi (59.3%) Bujumbura, Gitega Amstel, Primus, Heineken
Cameroon Brasseries du Cameroun    (8.8%)
Bafoussam, Douala,      
Garoua, Yaoundé Amstel, Mützig, Heineken
Congo Brasseries du Congo (50%) Brazzaville, Pointe Noire Guinness, Maltina, Mützig, Ngok, Primus, Turbo King, Heineken
Democratic 
Republic of Congo Bralima (95%)
Boma, Bukavu, Kinshasa, 
Kisangani, Mbandaka, 
Lubumbashi
Maltina, Mützig, Primus, Turbo King, Legend, Heineken, 
Amstel
Badr, El Obour, Sharkí Heineken, Birell, Fayrouz, Meister Max,
6th of October City,     
Gianaclis Sakara, Stella, Amstel Zero,
El Gouna Luxor
Ethiopia Bedele Brewery (100%) Bedele Bedele
Harar Brewery (100%) Harar Harar
Ghana Guinness Ghana Breweries Ltd. (20%) Accra, Kumasi Amstel Malta, Guinness, Gulder, Star, Malta, Heineken
Israel Tempo Beverages Limited (40%) Netanya
Heineken, GoldStar, Maccabi, Nesher Malt, Newcastle 
Brown Ale
Jordan General Investment        (10.8%) Zerka Amstel, Heineken
Lebanon Almaza (67%) Beirut Almaza, Laziza, Amstel, Heineken
Morocco Brasseries du Maroc         (2.2%) Casablanca, Fès, Tanger Heineken, Fayrouz
Namibia Namibia Breweries         (14.6%) Windhoek Heineken, Guinness, Windhoek, Amstel, Tafel
Nigerian Breweries Plc 
(54.1%)




ljebu Ode, Awo-Omamma, 
Makurdi, Lagos, Uyo
Réunion Brasseries de Bourbon     (85.7%) Saint Denis Bourbon, Dynamalt, Heineken
Rwanda Bralirwa (75%) Gisenyi, Kigali Amstel, Guinness, Mützig, Primus, Turbo King, Heineken
Sierra Leone Sierra Leone Brewery     (83.1%) Freetown Heineken, Guinness, Maltina, Star
South Africa Sedibeng Brewery (75%) Johannesburg (Sedibeng) Heineken, Amstel, Windhoek, Strongbow, Guinness
Tunisia Nouvelle de Brasserie ‘Sonobra’ (49.99%) Grombalia, Ksar Lemsa Heineken, Golden Brau, Fayrouz, Bravo, Sahara
Heineken, Amstel Malta, Gulder, Legend, Maltina, Star, 
Fayrouz, Life Continental Lager, Goldberg Lager, Malta 
Gold ‘33’ Export, Hi-malt, Maltex, Turbo King, More 
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Cambodia Cambodia Brewery (33.5%) Phnom Penh ABC Extra Stout, Anchor, Gold Crown, Tiger
Shanghai Asia Pacific Brewery 
(46%) Shanghai Heineken, Reeb, Tiger, Anchor, Aoke,
Hainan Asia Pacific Brewery 
(46%) Haikou Tiger Crystal, Sol, Strongbow, Murphy’s
Guanghzhou Asia Pacific 
Brewery (46%) Guanghzhou Irish Red
United Breweries              
(37.5%)
Cherthala, Palakkad, Hyderabad, 
Ponda, Ludhiana, Chopanki, 




UB Ajanta Breweries          
(50%) Aurangabad
Indonesia Multi Bintang Indonesia (40.6%)
Sampang Agung,                 
Tangerang Heineken, Bintang, Guinness, Bintang Zero, Green Sands
Laos Lao Asia Pacific Breweries (28.5%) Vientiane Tiger, Namkong, ABC Stout, Heineken
Malaysia Guinness Anchor Berhad (10.7%) Kuala Lumpur
Heineken, Anchor, Baron’s, Guinness, Strongbow, Kilkenny, Tiger, Lion, 
Malta, Anglia
Mongolia MCS Asia Pacific Brewery (23.1%) Ulaan Baatar Tiger, Sengur
New Caledonia Grande Brasserie de Nouvelle Calédonie (36.6%) Nouméa Heineken, Number One, Desperados, Havannah, Hinano
DB Breweries (41.9%) Greymouth, Mangatainoka,     Otahuhu
Heineken, Amstel, DB Draught, Export Gold, Export Dry, Tiger, 
Monteith’s, Tui, Fuse, Barrel 51, Murphy’s Irish Stout
DB South Island Brewery 
(23.1%) Timaru
Murphy’s Irish Red, Double Brown, Bushmans Draught, DB Draught, 




South Pacific Brewery      
(31.8%) Lae, Port Moresby Niugini Ice Beer, South Pacific Export Lager, SP Lager, SP Gold
Singapore Heineken, ABC Stout, Guinness Foreign Extra Stark, Raffles
Archipelago
Archipelago, Belgian Wit, Irish Ale, Bohemian Lager, Summer Ale, 
Strongbow, Bulmers, Guinness Draught, Erdinger, Kirin Ichiban, 
Kilkenny, Old Speckled Hen
Solomon Islands Solomon Breweries (40.9%) Honiara? Solbrew?
Sri Lanka Asia Pacific Brewery        (Lanka) (25.2%) Mawathagama
Bison, Kings Stout, Baron’s, Lager, Baron’s Strong Brew, ABC Stout, 
Anchor
Thailand Thai Asia Pacific Brewery (15.4%) Bangkok Heineken, Tiger, Cheers, Guinness, Kilkenny
Vietnam Brewery (25.2%) Ho Chi Minh City Heineken, Bivina, Tiger?
Asia Pacific Breweries      
(Hanoi) (41.9%) Hatay Heineken, Anchor Draft, Tiger, Larue
VBL Da Nang Co (25.2%) Da Nang?
VBL Tien Giang (25.2%) Tien Giang








India Heineken, Cannon 10000, Arlem, Baron’s Strong Brew, Kingfisher, Kalyani, UB
New Zealand






Source: Heineken International’s information 
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Exhibit 4 – SCC beer brands portfolio, 2012 
(a) Pilsner (also called as pilsener or pils) is a type of pale larger. It was named after the city of Pilsen, in Czech Republic, where it was created in 1842. It mainly      
uses malted barley, which gives it a lighter flavor, different from the more roasted or smoked flavors typically present in German beers. It is the most popular 
type of lager in the world. 
 (b) Lager is a type of beer, fermented and conditioned at low temperatures. There are two main types of lagers, the pale lagers (such as, Bock, Pilsner, 
Dortmunder Export and Märzen) and the dark lagers (such as, Dunkel and Schwarzbier) 
 (c) Stout is a dark beer made by roasted malt or roasted barley, hops, water and yeast. It is commonly a stronger, heavier flavor type of beer. However, it is also 
possible to find blonde stouts. There are several types of Stout beers, for example, Dry or Irish Stout, Imperial Stout, Porter, Milk Stout, Oatmeal Stout, 
Chocolate Stout, Coffee Stout, or Oyster Stout. 
 (d) Munich is a type of dark colored lager made by burnt malt, created in the 10th century in the city of Munich, in Germany. 
 
Source: SCC information 
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Exhibit 6 – Top 15 beer producing countries [million hectoliters], 2010 
!"#" !"## $%&'%()* +,&-./0
China 423,728 448,304 5,8% 24,3%
EUA 230,839 227,838 -1,3% 12,3%
Brazil 107,042 114,000 6,5% 6,2%
Russia 108,462 102,930 -5,1% 5,6%
Germany 98,036 95,683 -2,4% 5,2%
Mexico 82,360 79,889 -3,0% 4,3%
Japan 59,809 59,630 -0,3% 3,2%
U.K. 45,132 44,997 -0,3% 2,4%
Poland 32,224 33,900 5,2% 1,8%
Spain 33,815 33,375 -1,3% 1,8%
Ukraine 30,512 31,000 1,6% 1,7%
South Africa 28,794 29,600 2,8% 1,6%
Vietnam 22,984 26,500 15,3% 1,4%
Netherlands 25,383 23,936 -5,7% 1,3%
Canada 22,402 22,200 -0,9% 1,2%
World beer production 2010: 1 846,393
Market share top 15 countries 2010: 74.4%  
 Source: Barth Report 2010/2011 
 
Exhibit 7 – Top 15 brewers in the world [million hectoliters], 2010 
!""# !"$" %&'(&)*+ ,-'./01
Anheuser-Bush Inbev (B/USA) 358,8 358,7 -0,03% 19,4%
SABMiller (U.K.) 174,0 172,3 -1,0% 9,3%
Heineken (NL) 159,1 145,9 -8,3% 7,9%
Carlsberg (DK) 116,0 114,0 -1,7% 6,2%
China Reource Brewery Ltd. (China) 84,0 93,3 11,1% 5,1%
Tsingtao Brewery Group (China) 59,0 64,0 8,5% 3,5%
Grupo Modelo (MEX) 51,8 51,9 0,2% 2,8%
Yanjing (China) 46,7 50,3 7,7% 2,7%
Molson-Coors (USA/CND) 52,5 48,7 -7,2% 2,6%
Kirin (J) 22,5 30,3 34,7% 1,6%
Efes Group (TR) 22,1 24,2 9,5% 1,3%
BGI/Group Castel (FR) 21,8 23,5 7,8% 1,3%
Diageo (Guinness) (IRL) 22,0 22,0 0,0% 1,2%
Asahi (J) 22,4 21,8 -2,7% 1,2%
Polar (VE) 18,2 20,7 13,7% 1,1%   
Source: Barth Report 2010/2011 
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1  Czech Republic 131,7 -21.1 1 708
2  Germany 106,8 -3.7 8 787
3  Austria 105,8 -1 888
4  Ireland 103,7 -2.8 479
5  Estonia 90,6 -8.8 117
6  Lithuania 85,7 12.7 304
7  Poland 83,6 -0.3 3 215
8  Australia 83,4 -7.2 1 794
9  Venezuela 83 -4.7 2 259
12  United States 78,2 -2.5 24 138
17  Netherlands 73,9 1.4 1 224
18  United Kingdom 73,7 -3.4 4 587
20  New Zealand 70,5 -3.6 300
22  Spain 69,9 -1.1 3 251
23  Canada 68,4 -1.9 2 311
26  Russia 66,2 -6.8 9 389
27  Brazil 65,3 10 12 170
29  South Africa 63 4.4 3 095
30  Switzerland 57,3 0 453
31  Mexico 57,1 -2.9 6 419
32  Portugal 54,9 -3.2 590
33  Angola 52,7 5 898
36  Japan 45,5 -2.4 5 813
40  China 31,5 2.1 44 683
=.#> !"%#(,?
	  
Source: Kirin Holdings information 
 
Exhibit 9 – Major beer brands and companies in Portugal, 2012 
!"#$%& '()* !"#$%% '()* !"#$%+
Market share by Volume (%)
Sagres 43,6 -0,5 43,1 -0,2 42,9
Super Bock 41,3 0,0 41,3 -0,4 40,9
Desperados 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1
Heineken 0,7 0,1 0,8 0,0 0,8
Carlsberg 1,6 0,0 1,5 0,3 1,8
Imperial 1,2 -0,1 1,1 -0,2 0,9
Cristal 4,1 -0,6 3,6 0,4 4,0
MDD+PP 3,5 1,2 4,7 0,1 4,8
Cergal 2,2 0,1 2,3 0,0 2,3
Marina 0,5 -0,1 0,4 0,2 0,6
Tagus 0,5 -0,2 0,3 -0,1 0,2
Market share by Value (%)
Sagres 45,9 -0,6 45,3 -0,1 45,2
Super Bock 43,2 0,6 43,8 -0,2 43,6
Desperados 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1
Heineken 1,0 0,5 1,6 -0,3 1,3
Carlsberg 2,0 -0,2 1,8 0,3 2,1
Imperial 0,6 -0,1 0,5 -0,1 0,4
Cristal 3,3 -0,6 2,7 0,2 2,9
MDD+PP 1,2 0,4 1,6 0,2 1,8
Cergal 0,8 0,1 0,9 0,1 1,0
Marina 0,2 0,0 0,2 0,1 0,3
Tagus 0,6 -0,2 0,4 -0,1 0,4 	  	  	  	  
!"#$%& '()* !"#$%% '()* !"#$%+
Market share by Volume (%)
SCC 48,1 -0,5 47,6 -0,5 47,1
UNICER 47,7 -0,7 47,0 0,5 47,5
MDD's+PP's 3,5 1,2 4,7 0,1 4,8
CEREURO 0,5 -0,2 0,3 -0,1 0,2
FONT SALEM 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,1
Market share by Value (%)
SCC 48,9 -0,1 48,8 -0,5 48,3
UNICER 48,9 -0,2 48,7 0,4 49,1
MDD's+PP's 1,2 0,4 1,6 0,2 1,8
CEREURO 0,6 -0,2 0,5 -0,1 0,4
FONT SALEM 0,1 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,1
Source: AC Nielsen report 2012	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Exhibit 10 – Sagres (SCC) and Super Bock (Unicer) market shares in Portugal, 2012 
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Market share by Volume (%)
Sagres Branca 39,4 -1,0 38,4 0,7 39,0
S.Bock Branca 37,9 0,2 38,1 -0,2 38,0
Bohemia 0,4 -0,1 0,3 0,0 0,2
Abadia 0,3 -0,1 0,2 0,0 0,2
Sagres Preta 2,2 0,1 2,4 -0,1 2,3
S.Bock Stout 1,5 -0,1 1,4 0,0 1,4
Sagres Sem Álcool 1,5 -0,1 1,3 -0,1 1,2
S Bock Sem Álcool 1,3 -0,2 1,1 -0,2 1,0
Sagres Festa 0,0 0,8 0,8 -0,7 0,1
S Bock Classic 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,3
S Puro Malte 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1
Sagres Limalight+Panaché 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
S.Bock Green 0,2 -0,1 0,1 0,0 0,1
Market share by Value (%)
Sagres Branca 41,2 -1,1 40,1 0,7 40,8
S.Bock Branca 39,8 0,7 40,5 -0,2 40,3
Bohemia 0,4 -0,1 0,3 0,0 0,3
Abadia 0,3 -0,1 0,2 0,0 0,3
Sagres Preta 2,7 0,2 2,9 -0,2 2,7
S.Bock Stout 1,7 -0,1 1,6 0,1 1,7
Sagres Sem Álcool 1,5 -0,1 1,4 -0,1 1,2
S Bock Sem Álcool 1,2 -0,1 1,1 -0,1 1,0
Sagres Festa 0,0 0,6 0,6 -0,5 0,1
S Bock Classic 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,3
S Puro Malte 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1
Sagres Limalight+Panaché 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
S.Bock Green 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,1 	  
Source: AC Nielsen report 2012 
 
Exhibit 11 – Portuguese beer market volume and value (€), 2012 
YTD 11 YTD 12 YTD 11 YTD 12
BEER TOTAL 297 824 102                266 248 604              725 307 672              683 580 784                  
SCC 141 769 813                125 436 847              353 698 970              329 916 330                  
UNICER 140 125 476                126 573 721              352 957 742              335 366 864                  
FDIST 13 933 864                  12 742 705                11 815 817                12 495 868                   
CEREURO 885 452                       500 417                     3 278 172                 2 531 184                     



























Value variance -  YTD12 vs. YTD11 
	  
Source: AC Nielsen report 2012 
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Portugal 63.0 68 70.0 ! 60.0 ! 59.0 " 25.5 " 82.6 ! 32.5 " 83.0 ! 70.0 ! 87.1 " 60.0 !
Brazil 57.9 99 50.0 ! 37.0 ! 69.1 ! 54.8 ! 75.8 " 59.1 ! 53.7 " 50.0 ! 69.7 " 60.0 !

























Source: Terry Miller, Kim R. Holmes, and Edwin J. Feulner, 2012 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: The 
Heritage and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2012), at www.heritage.org/index. 
 
Exhibit 13 – Economic Freedom Score comparison, 2012 



























Source: Terry Miller, Kim R. Holmes, and Edwin J. Feulner, 2012 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: The 
Heritage and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2012), at www.heritage.org/index. 
 

























Portugal 1,4 46,5 26,5 10,6 247 23 223 10,8 1,4 1 452,4 35,2 49,8
Brazil 7,6 27,5 34 193,3 2 172,1 11 239 7 5 48 438 34,3 38,8
Angola 7,4 17 35 19,1 107,3 5 632 N/A 14,5 9 941,6 9 39,5
 
 Source: Terry Miller, Kim R. Holmes, and Edwin J. Feulner, 2012 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: The 
Heritage and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2012), at www.heritage.org/index. 
 
Exhibit 15 – Human Development Index (HDI), 2011 
!"#$
%&'()*+,#-./012
Portugal 41 1 ! 0,81 very high 0,001 "
Brazil 85 1 " 0,718 high 0,003 "








Source: Wikipedia information 
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(*) More relevant brands: 
Cristal, Sagres, SUperbock, 
Heineken and Carlsberg 
 
(**) Produced in Angola: 33 
Export, Castel Beer, Tchizo, 
Ngola Preta, Doppel Munich 
	  
Source: Castel Cuca BGI Group 
	  
Exhibit 17 – Beer prices in Angola, 2012 
120 Heineken 115 Heineken 90 Cristal 90 Carlsberg 85 Cristal
Kz (SCC) Kz (SCC) Kz (Unicer) Kz (Unicer) Kz (Unicer)
33cl can 25cl bottle 33cl can 25cl bottle 33cl bottle
3,64Kz 4,60Kz 2,73Kz 3,60Kz 2,58Kz
85 Super Bock Mini (a) 80 EKA 80 Super Bock 75 Castel Mini 75 Super Bock
Kz (Unicer) Kz (CUCA BGI) Kz (Unicer) Kz (CUCA BGI) Kz (Unicer)
25cl bottle 31cl bottle 33cl bottle 25cl bottle 33cl can
3,40Kz 2,58Kz 2,42Kz 3,00Kz 2,27Kz
75 Sagres 75 Nocal 70 Cuca 70 Cuca 70 Sagres Mini (a)
Kz (SCC) Kz (CUCA BGI) Kz (CUCA BGI) Kz (CUCA BGI) Kz (SCC)
33cl bottle 31cl bottle 33cl can 31cl bottle 25cl bottle
2,27Kz 2,40Kz 2,12Kz 2,26Kz 2,80Kz
65 Sagres (b) 60 N'Gola 50 33 Export (c)
Kz (SCC) Kz (CUCA BGI) Kz (CUCA BGI) (a)Easy Opening cap system
25cl bottle 33cl bottle 33cl bottle (b)Regular cap system
(c)Promotional value
Kz  -Kwanzas (Angolan currency)
2,60Kz 1,82Kz 1,52Kz cl - centiliter
Price per 
centiliter



































Source: Exame Angola 
	  
















Source: Castel Cuca BGI Group 
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Exhibit 20 – Major beer companies and brands in Brazil, 2011 
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1º AB InBev / Ambev 69,8
Skol, Brahma, Antarctica, Bohemia, Antarctica 
Original, Serramalte, Stella Artois, Caracu, 
Polar, Norteña, Patrícia, Pilsen, Quilmes,         
and more
2º Cervejaria Petrópolis 10,3 Itaipava, Crystal, Petra
3º Kirin / Schincariol 10
Nova Schin, Devassa, Primus, Glacial, Cintra, 
Nobel, Baden Baden, Eisenbahn
4º Heineken / FEMSA 8,5
Kaiser, Kaiser Summer Draft, Sol, Bavária, 
Heineken, Xingu
 
Source: AC Nielsen report 2011 
 






1º SKOL AB InBev / Ambev Pilsner 4,7 32,7
2º BRAHMA AB InBev / Ambev Pilsner 5 18,5
3º ANTARCTICA AB InBev / Ambev Pilsner 4,9 12,3
4º NOVA SCHIN Kirin / Schincariol Pilsner 4,7 10,3
5º KAISER Heineken / FEMSA Pilsner 4,5 4
6º BAVÁRIA Heineken / FEMSA Pilsner 4,3 2,2
7º SOL Heineken / FEMSA Pilsner 4,5 0,5
85"#9
	  
Source: AC Nielsen report November 2009 
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Exhibit 22 – Heineken Brazil beer brands portfolio, 2012 
	  
!"#$% &'() *+,-.-+//////0 1"232$
White Pilsner 4,5 Brazil
Bock(a) Munich 6,2 Brazil
Gold Pilsner extra 5,4 Brazil
Heineken Heineken Pilsner 5 Brazil
White Pilsner 4,6 Brazil
Premium Pilsner 4,8 Brazil
White No Alcohol Beer 0,5 Brazil
White Pilsner 4,6 Brazil
Premium Pilsner 4,3 Brazil
Summer White Pilsner 4,7 Brazil
Xingu Dark Stout 4,6 Brazil
Santa       
Cerva
White Pilsner 4,9 Brazil
!"#$%&'(# Lager 4,5 Mexico
)*#+,-$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
.'-#, Lager 4,7 Netherlands
/(001$$$$$$$$$$$$$
2"0,++( Lager 4,6 Italy
%3,-4(## Wheat Beer 5,5 Austria
2'05678#$$$$$$$$$$
90(#6$:+"'+ Stout 4 Ireland
2'05678#$$$$$$$$$$$
90(#6$;,3 Red Ale 5,2 Ireland

















(a) Seasonal edition – super premium beer 
 
Source: Heineken Brazil information 
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2. Teaching Note 
2.1 Introduction 
This case study was prepared based on a real business scenario, although some of the data has 
been disguised in order to preserve the confidentiality of “Sociedade Central de Cervejas” and 
“Heineken International”.  The content of this case has been put together as a basis for class 
discussion, preserving all important data relationships. The case though, should not be regarded as a 
source of primary data. 
2.2 Synopsis 
 “Sociedade Central de Cervejas e Bebidas, S.A” (SCC), founded in 1934, was a company 
specialized in producing and marketing beer, water and other beverages, detaining some of the most 
iconic and appreciated Portuguese brands in these industries. In 2007, the forth-largest group of the 
global beer industry, the Dutch company “Heineken”, had acquired SCC. After the acquisition, the 
Portuguese company was able to remain functioning in the same way it had done as before, since 
Heineken believed local knowledge and expertise to be a key resource in their international strategy, 
endowing its subsidiaries with substantial empowerment and providing them with support at many 
business levels. SCC started its international experience early in its history, with the creation of its 
most important brand “Sagres” in 1940, with the single purpose of being exported. The success 
achieved by this brand soon guaranteed a notorious presence in the national market and the 
establishment of exports to almost every Portuguese overseas territory and countries with Portuguese 
influence and emigration. 
In 2012, the Portuguese beer market, along with the entire beer market in Europe, was 
experiencing a continuous and threatening downturn in sales volumes and margins. Consumption of 
all kind of beverages was contracting due to a decrease in consumers’ purchasing power in 
consequence of the global financial crisis. In Portugal, the beer market was controlled by “Sociedade 
Central de Cervejas e Bebidas” (SCC) and “Unicer”, two national companies that were backed up by 
two of the largest international companies in this industry, Heineken International and Carlsberg 
respectively. With results in the national markets worsening year-by-year, both these Portuguese 
companies saw internationalization as a means of survival. 
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After meeting with their partner Heineken about the issues experienced in that period, SCC 
had been given a four-month task until the end of 2012. SCC was in charge of developing a strategic 
and operational plan of action to expand and improve the company’s presence in two evolving beer 
markets with Portuguese influence, Angola and Brazil, aligned with Heineken’s international goals 
and strategy.  
This case presents all the data that SCC managers had at the time to make a decision regarding 
these two countries. In Angola, they were asked to re-evaluate the company’s current approach to the 
market, while in Brazil they had to evaluate the best way of entry into a complex and competitive 
market. Both markets present different potentialities and threats for SCC, also the company’s 
objectives and targets behind each country differed. 
2.3 Suggested Assignment Questions 
1. Having in mind the Portuguese economical situation in 2012, how could SCC improve its 
performance in the national market by expanding/enhancing its operations overseas? Identify the 
opportunities and threats each of these countries had. 
2. Should SCC continue to export its “Sagres” brand or should they try to produce it again in 
Angola? Where should tariffs’ increase be reflected in case they chose to continue exporting 
“Sagres”? Explain why. 
3. If SCC decides to engage in foreign direct investment by starting to produce and sell a different 
brand of beer in Angola, how should this be positioned and targeted? Could there be a 
cannibalization problem? 
4. SCC was not present in Brazil yet. What would be the best way to enter this market? How should 
its product be positioned and targeted? 
5. Could a Portuguese beer brand adequately fit the Heineken Brazil beer portfolio? Justify.  
6. Would both these specific internationalization projects of SCC be advantageous for Heineken, or 
could it actually bring some damages/constraints to the group, such as cannibalization? 
7. Identify some pros and cons of the two internationalization strategy categories – ”foreign direct 
investment” and ”transactions”? Try to illustrate with the case. 
8. Is it possible two identify a better international expansion alternative for SCC to follow between 
the two presented in the case? Justify. 
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2.4 Teaching Objectives 
1. To alert students to the complexity in analyzing and entering distinct foreign markets effectively, 
and understand the needs of an individual approach to each country.   
2. To have students identify the different internationalization strategy alternatives companies have 
to enter foreign markets, as well as, the advantages and disadvantages present in each strategy. 
3. To help students identify the different reasons for a company to expand operations globally, and 
evaluate distinct internationalization projects and the resulting benefits produced by each one of 
them. 
4. To have students become familiar with some hurdles existing in the internationalization processes 
in rapidly evolving economies and developing countries. 
5. To help students acquire a good understanding about the different positioning and targeting 
strategies, based on brand image, brand association, customer perceptions, and consumption 
patterns, at an international scope. 
6. To have students explore the importance of local knowledge, market research, and the advantages 
and disadvantages of using foreign brands to influence customer perceptions and boost portfolio 
sales.   
7. To illustrate to students some entry strategies and behaviors to keep in mind when entering in a 
new foreign market that is already dominated by other powerful companies. 
8. To introduce students to the benefits and obstacles prevalent from a relationship between an 
empowered subsidiary and a giant international group, and how opportunities for both can be 
aligned. 
2.5 Use of the Case 
This case presents to students a real scenario that companies of that time were urged to deal 
with. The globalization effect not only brought along some negative impacts on societies and world 
economies, but it also gave companies the opportunity to go beyond frontiers and expand their 
operations. Besides consumption habits and behaviors becoming more standardized throughout the 
world, companies still had to make sure to develop a carefully planned approach to each market, and 
to be familiar with the remaining diverse political, social and environmental realities of each country. 
This case aims to alert students to these issues brought by the global market paradigm and to prepare 
them for the changes or novelties influencing strategic business decisions. 
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The “Sociedade Central de Cervejas e Bebidas” case was designed to be used in a masters 
level international strategy course, such as, international business, international industry analysis or 
managing in a global context, or in a master level international marketing course. Although, it can also 
have an appropriate fit in other core undergraduate and master level strategy courses or marketing 
courses, under the topics of market analysis and research, advanced strategic management, market 
positioning and differentiation, brand management, marketing management, marketing 
communications, portfolio management and consumer behavior. 
2.6 Relevant Theory 
This case aims to introduce international business administration students to the complex and 
difficult task of establishing a successful strategy to enter new foreign markets or to have the best 
approach towards increasing the company’s international commitment. In order to enrich this learning 
experience, some theoretical models and information to support this case discussion and analysis were 
included in the teaching note. The following books and respective theories were used in this analysis: 
 
1. PEST Analysis – Freire, A., 2008, Estratégia – Sucesso em Portugal, 12th edition, Verbo. 
 
2. Porter’s Five Forces – Porter, M. E., 2008, ‘The Five Competitive Forces that Shape Strategy’               
Harvard Business Review, pp. 86-104 
 
3. Porter’s Value Chain – Porter, M. E., 1996, ‘What is strategy?’ Harvard Business Review, pp. 61-78. 
 
4. Critical Success Factors, Key Buying Factors and Competition Engines – Freire, A., 2008, 
Estratégia – Sucesso em Portugal, 12th edition, Verbo. 
 
5. New SWOT Analysis – Freire, A., 2008, Estratégia – Sucesso em Portugal, 12th edition, Verbo. 
 
6. Uppsala Model – Blomstermo,A. & Sharma, D., 2003, Learning in the Internationalisation Process of 
Firms (New Horizons in International Business), illustrated edition, Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 
 
7. Internationalization Strategy Categories (Transactions and Foreign Direct Investments) – Freire, 
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2.7 Analysis and Discussion 
The discussion of this case follows the eight assignment questions listed above. These 
questions and respective discussion points were prepared to integrate a 90-minute class, where the 
instructor can accurately cover some of the key learning points present in the case. The suggested time 
distribution for these questions is the following: 
 
 
1st Question Opportunities and Threats in Angola and Brazil for SCC 20 minutes 
2nd Question Internationalization strategy options for Angola and the import tariff issue 20 minutes 
3rd Question Introducing a new beer brand in Angola 10 minutes 
4th Question Internationalization and marketing strategy options to enter the Brazilian market  10 minutes 
5th Question Portfolio Management in Brazil 5 minutes 
6th Question Opportunities and Threats in Angola and Brazil for Heineken 10 minutes 
7th Question Transactions vs. Foreign Direct Investments 10 minutes 
8th Question Comparing the Angola and Brazil internationalization options 
5 minutes Summary            
& Wrap-Up Final Recommendations and Comments 
 
1st Question 
Having in mind the Portuguese economical situation in 2012, how could SCC improve its performance 
in the national market by expanding/enhancing its operations overseas? Identify the opportunities and 
threats each of these countries had. 
• This question should take at least 20 minutes to be covered, serving as an introduction to the case 
discussion, where the professor could randomly ask some students to share their opinion about the 
case study, more specifically asking about the problems faced by SCC and what possible solutions 
were found in this scenario. The use of the tables in class would be advisable to enhance class 
discussion.  
The beer market in Portugal in 2012 had continued to fall considerably, as well as, the entire 
European beer market. In this year, the Portuguese market had shown a 10,6% decrease compared to 
2011, which had alerted SCC managers and Heineken’s representatives to find solutions to support 
this important subsidiary in Portugal. SCC was important for Heineken by having a dominant 
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participation in the Portuguese market, exporting to several countries in Europe and around the world, 
the principal target being the Portuguese communities and the former Portuguese overseas territories. 
The downturn of the Portuguese market was threatening the sustainability and profitability of the 
infrastructures in Portugal, and the decrease in volumes sold and produced, made it difficult to support 
its physical and human structures due to the high costs associated with this. At this moment, the results 
achieved in Angola were crucial for SCC infrastructures’ sustainability. Through the increased 
volumes exported to Angola it was possible to compensate part of the volume lost in Portugal, 
although the profits of beer sold in Angola were much smaller than that achieved in Portugal.  
With these details in mind, SCC and Heineken managers had to think of a strategy to 
overcome this threat. Taking into account that all Heineken’s European operations were also being 
threatened by the same issue, the solution appeared to be out of Europe, in countries that were still 
showing positive results in the beer sector. Looking specifically into the SCC case, the managers in 
charge for the internationalization strategy of this company had turned their attention to two potential 
markets where SCC could have a better chance of getting good results. The first market was Angola, 
where this company had already acquired experience and knowledge of the market and had 
established important contacts, having convictions of the market’s potential and the best way and 
timing to guarantee its presence in this country. The second one appeared to be Brazil, one of the most 
rapidly developing economies in the world that had a significant Portuguese influence and a large 
Portuguese community in the country. This huge market had not been targeted by SCC due to the high 
investment needed and import tariffs. 
In order to evaluate these two internationalization options, it would be necessary to identify 
both countries’ macro environmental factors, as well as, to analyze the company’s strengths and 
weaknesses. The macro environmental factors can be easily assessed through a PEST34 analysis (see 
TN Exhibit 1 and TN Exhibit 2) and the micro environmental factors through a Porter’s five forces 
analysis, which would provide us the industry’s attractiveness. To help detecting company’s strengths 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
34	  Acronym	  for	  “Political-Legal, Economical, Socio-Cultural, and Technological”. Can be also called PESTEL analysis.	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TN Exhibit 1 – Angola PEST Analysis 
 
Political-Legal factors 
• Extremely high corruption levels 
• Weak property rights 
• Significantly fiscal free 
• Reasonable government spending 
• African continent economical power 
Economical factors 
• Reduced business freedom 
• Emerging economy 
• Increasing GDP 
• Hard to invest, due to risk, bureaucracy and complexity                         
of the process 
• Easiness on trading, but predicted to become more difficult 
(beer import’s tariffs to increase from 30% to 50%) 
• Extremely high inflation rate – 14,5%  
Socio-Cultural factors 
• Idiosyncrasies among southern African countries 
• Connect foreign products/services with quality 
• Great discrepancy between social classes, even though a middle 
class is slowly appearing 
• Population of 19,1 million 
• Low on Human Development index                                              
(ranked 148th out of 187 countries) 
• High levels of criminality 
• Official Language – Portuguese 
Technological factors 
• Poor transportation infrastructures (roads, systems, etc) 
• Distribution systems are sometimes different                         
(importers’ warehouses) 
• Recent developments in factories’ technology and agriculture 
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TN Exhibit 2 – Brazil PEST Analysis 
 
Political-Legal factors 
• High corruption levels 
• Fair property rights 
• Limited fiscal freedom 
• The biggest power in Latin America 
• Protectionism policy, high imports’ tariffs and related taxes  
Economical factors 
• Restricted business freedom 
• One of the most important developing economies in the world 
(BRIC) 
• Increasing GDP per capita 
• Extremely condensed and competitive market 
• High inflation rate – 5%  
• Large flow of foreign direct investment to the country 
Socio-Cultural factors 
• Large Portuguese community living in the country  
• Marked Portuguese legacy 
• Great discrepancy between social classes, although the middle class 
is getting stronger and larger 
• Extremely populous, 193,3 million residents 
• High on Human Development index                                              
(ranked 85th out of 187 countries) 
• High levels of criminality 
• Highly segmented market 
• Consumers openness to try and discover new product/service 
concepts 
• Two huge world sporting events happening in 2014, the FIFA 
World Cup, and in 2016, the Olympic games. 
• Official Language – Portuguese 
Technological factors 
• Good infrastructures and transportation network 
• High government expenditures and support 
• Most advanced technology available in the country 
• Biggest companies in the world are greatly constructing and 
investing in this country 
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With the information provided in the case study it is possible to develop a Porter’s Five 
Forces analysis for each country. Regarding Angola, bargaining supplier’s power, threat of new 
entrants and threat of substitutes can be considered low, while rivalry is at a medium level and the 
bargaining buyer’s power is high. While in Brazil, only bargaining supplier’s power and threat of new 
entrants are low, bargaining buyer’s power being medium, and both rivalry and threat of substitutes 
high. 
By using the Porter’s Value Chain we can also have an idea, through the information 
provided in the case study, about the SCC’s advantages and weaknesses in each market. To make 
further analyses easier students could be asked in class to develop this model, assessing company’s 
primary activities; namely inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing & sales and 
service, and secondary activities, containing procurement, human resource management, technological 
development and infrastructures. The strengths and weaknesses for each country are further listed in 
the New SWOT Analysis. 
 
These analyses together with an industry life-cycle examination of these two markets and the 
assessment of the company’s critical success factors, key buying factors and competition engines (see 
TN Exhibit 3 and TN Exhibit 4) in each market would provide some useful support to perform a New 
SWOT Analysis35 (see TN Exhibit 5 and TN Exhibit 6) and identify the opportunities available for SCC. 
Both these countries seem to be in the mature phase of the industry life-cycle closer to the 
growth phase, with well implemented local companies competing with big international groups, 
presenting diversified products, an increased segmentation, and innovative concepts appearing. Both 
these markets in 2012 were seeing great volume growth. 
TN Exhibit 3 – SCC’s Critical Success Factors, Key Buying Factors and Competition Engines in Angola 
Source: Case writer                
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
35	  Freire, A., 2008, Estratégia	  –	  Sucesso	  em	  Portugal, 12th edition, Verbo. 
Critical Success Factors Key Buying Factors Competition Engines 






• Fresh alcoholic drink with  
a light and smooth taste 
• Country of origin – 
imported quality 
• Social habit 
• Satisfy thirsty 
• Price 
• Status 
• Brand image - Status 
• Price 
• Taste 
• Innovation – R&D 
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TN Exhibit 4 – SCC’s Critical Success Factors, Key Buying Factors and Competition Engines in Brazil 
Source: Case writer                
 
After applying these models with information available in the case, it should suggest to 
students that both the Angola and Brazilian markets were attractive for this Portuguese beer company, 
and consequently for Heineken also. 
TN Exhibit 5 – New SWOT Analysis for Angola 
Strengths Weaknesses 
• Sagres brand image 
• Country of Origin gives status to its brand 
• Relationship with customers and key partners 
• Knowledge and experience of the country 
• Managerial and operational expertise 
• Heineken’s support 
• Marketing and sales expertise 
• Taste not appreciated has much as other local 
beers and the imported beer Cristal 
• Need to reduce personnel and production 
capacity 
• Less profits acquired in the Portuguese market 
• Lack of financial resources for R&D 
Short/Medium Term Opportunities Medium/Long Term Opportunities 
• Sustain Company’s Portuguese infrastructures 
• Increase Sagres sales volume 
• Pressures to engage in the construction of a 
brewing plant 
• Corruption 
• Relating foreign products/services with 
superior quality 
• Weaker performance in the European markets 
• Consumers’ increasing purchasing power 
• Target different segments 
• Improve the company’s profitability 
• Expand SCC’s international presence 
• Subsidize R&D and new projects 
• Difficult to invest in the country 
• Enter or give a better support to other 
countries in Africa 
• Improvements in agriculture 
Source: Case writer based on Freire, A., 2008, Estratégia	  –	  Sucesso	  em	  Portugal, 12th edition, Verbo. 







• Fresh alcoholic drink with  
a light and smooth taste 
• Brand Image –     
Portuguese beer 
• Inherited social habits 







	   37	  
Suggested solutions for Angola: 
 
• Continue to export Sagres to Angola, making sure its positioning is not changed, which has allowed 
better results year-after-year, until there is consistent proof to do so. 
• Start exporting superior Sagres product categories targeted specifically to the wealthier segments  
• Participate more consistently in this market and expand its operations through the construction of a 
brewing plant in Angola. 
• A lower priced beer like Cergal and another beer to compete directly with Cuca, could be produced 
in this country 
• Finance new Research & Development projects and marketing initiatives in order to progress in the 
Portuguese beer market and also in Angola. 
 
TN Exhibit 6 – New SWOT Analysis for Brazil 
Strengths Weaknesses 
• Sagres brand image 
• Country of Origin 
• Relationship with customers  
• Heineken country’s experiential knowledge  
• Companies’ managerial and operational 
expertise  
• Marketing and sales expertise 
• Being dependent on Heineken’s evaluation 
and decision to engage in a larger 
internationalization project  
• No financial resources to invest in Brazil 
• Lack of financial resources for R&D 
Short/Medium Term Opportunities Medium/Long Term Opportunities 
• Heineken’s support and already implemented 
infrastructures in the country 
• Increase SCC’s and Heineken’s profitability 
• Sustain Company’s Portuguese infrastructures 
• Highly segmented market 
• Extremely protectionist policies  
• Two huge world sporting events 
• Heineken’s FEMSA beer sector acquisition 
• Weaker performance in the European markets 
• Large Portuguese community in Brazil 
• Consumers’ increasing purchasing power  
• Heineken gaining market share 
• More Portuguese expatriates going to the 
Americas 
• Improve the company’s profitability 
• Expand SCC’s international presence 
• Constant needed for R&D 
• Consumers openness to try and discover new 
product/service concepts 
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Suggested solutions for Brazil: 
 
• Take advantage of already implemented infrastructures and distribution network of Heineken Brazil 
to produce and market the Sagres brand. The weaker situation observed in Europe could support 
Heineken’s decision to make this investment in the American markets.  
• A niche segment in this country could generate very significant profits for SCC. Profits could be 
used to support operations in Portugal and to invest in the Portuguese brand beer expansion in Brazil. 
• Start exports to other Latin American countries 
• Finance new Research & Development projects and marketing initiatives in order to progress in the 
Portuguese beer market and also in Brazil. 
 
 
Before moving on to the next question, it would also be interesting to support these 
internationalization projects with another theoretical evidence, which is explained in Learning in the 
Internationalisation Process of Firms, the Uppsala model (see TN Exhibit 7). This theory tries to explain 
how companies should gradually strengthen their operations in external markets. It is based on the 
idea that companies should follow a process that starts by gathering some experience in the respective 
domestic market, to then expand its activities to culturally and/or geographically close countries, and 
later to other more distant countries in both senses. Companies should preferably start their presence 
in a new market through an internationalization transaction strategy, such as exports or licensing, and 
later should look to other options such as foreign direct investments or projects in the country. A good 
example of this could be the case of Angola, where the Portuguese company SCC started to operate in 
this foreign market through beer exports, and somehow during this process has realized that other 
opportunities are available for gradually intensifying its activities and investments within that country.  
 










Source: Blomstermo,A. & Sharma, D., 2003, Learning in the Internationalisation Process of Firms (New Horizons in International 













State	  aspects	   Change	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2nd Question 
Should SCC continue to export its “Sagres” brand or should they try to produce it again in Angola? 
Where should tariffs’ increase be reflected in case they chose to continue exporting “Sagres”? Explain 
why. 
• This question should take at least 20 minutes to be covered. Here students can start giving their 
opinion whether Sagres should continue to be exported or produced again in Angola. 
Why should Sagres be exported? 
Angolans perceive the Sagres brand as a premium quality imported beer brand. This 
“imported” status of the brand seems to give consumers by itself the idea of a superior quality. This 
can be due to the Angolans way of thinking, in which what comes from abroad should have a better 
quality than what is national. 
Sagres had been present in the Angolan market since the 1940’s, having the opportunity to 
establish its brand image and conquer a place in the market in a very consistent way throughout the 
times. Although there was one episode that changed its faith, the moment they started producing 
Sagres in this country. Consumers’ perceptions were defrauded, it seemed that this change alone had 
given a reason for consumers to change to Cuca brand or Super Bock, Unicer’s similar beer brand. 
Sagres sales were increasing until this moment, but in 2004 when Sagres started to be produced in 
Angola sales had the biggest fall in its history. This is the greatest proof that Sagres’ key competitive 
advantage and core attribute to survive in this market is its country of origin and thus being considered 
as a premium brand. Knowing this, it is easy to predict that a similar story could happen again. This 
incident has seriously affected SCC performance in Angola before, only reaching similar sales 
volumes eight years later, in 2012. This would be the main reason for SCC to continue exporting 
Sagres to Angola. 
Where should import tariffs increases be reflected? 
In this case, by continuing exporting Sagres to Angola, sooner or later SCC would have to 
face the issue of the Angolan government finally yielding towards local pressures and increase import 
tariffs. The foreseen increase from 30% to 50% will definitely have a significant impact on SCC 
performance, creating the need to review Sagres marketing strategy. The two options, are: 1) to reflect 
tariffs increase on final price to consumers or 2) on SCC’s margins. To make this decision SCC needs 
to know exactly what segment they want to target with this brand. 
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By applying a demographic segmentation, by income, we can accurately distinguish between 
three segments, each one assuming particular needs and characteristics. 
The lower segment is composed of poorer people, who value more freshness and price on a 
beer brand, who do not even consider buying an imported product. This category of beer consumers 
contributes to a significant part of the 80% of the market, which is fulfilled by local beer brands. 
CUCA Company, by far the leading firm in this country, detaining almost all local beer brands, had 
full control over this segment. Some examples of brands fulfilling the needs of this type of consumers 
are, N’Gola and 33 Export. 
The middle segment can be considered as an extension of the lower segment, in which 
consumers have more purchasing power but value the same needs of freshness, and a light and smooth 
taste, as well as a price that the lower segment has. Differently to the previous segment, these 
consumers actually consider some imported brands in their purchasing decision, like Cristal, Sagres 
and Super Bock that offer good quality with slightly higher prices. It is in this segment that Cristal is 
succeeding. These two segments represent the great majority of beer drinkers in Angola.  
Angola, as it was possible to infer from the economic freedom indexes and HDI exhibits, was 
a country with a great social class discrepancy. The Middle class was still quite reduced, poverty being 
shared by the majority of the nation’s citizens and wealth restricted to only a few.  
The upper segment is the one formed by the smaller group of rich people in Angola, that look 
for completely different needs than the other two segments. This consumer type look for status not 
only in their beers but also in everything they buy. They prefer to buy foreign products in order to get 
a superior quality and status. 
Taking into consideration this segmentation, it is possible to identify two different approaches 
for SCC, depending only on the target approach they want to take with the Sagres brand: 
The first, reflecting tariffs increase on prices, would reinforce the brand’s premium 
positioning, moving towards the needs of the upper rich segment. In this case SCC could be risking its 
current performance by neglecting middle segment consumers needs. The gap between Sagres and 
Cuca can become too big and drive current middle segment consumers to change to the cheaper 
options. This option seems to yield more towards profits rather than increased sales volumes. 
The second option, absorbing tariff increases on SCC ‘s margins, would maintain Sagres 
positioning but would mean a threatening impact on the company’s profitability. SCC was already 
getting less profit per unit sold in Angola compared to Portugal. 
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At this stage, with the weak financial situation present in Portugal in 2012, the main objective 
of SCC with its Sagres brand in Angola was to compensate the loss of volume in Portugal, sustaining 
this way the company’s infrastructures in its country of origin. With this goal in mind, the second 
option appear to be more suitable, by maintaining its strategy, through which SCC had been 
succeeding and seen its sales doubling in 2011. 
There would be also another opportunity that SCC could explore in case they chose to keep 
exporting Sagres. Product innovations and different product categories could be introduced in this 
market, by which the company could create different product lines to augment its presence in the 
middle segment and other products to enter specifically in the upper segment. It is true that local 
producers detain power and a production capacity to fulfill the entire market, but there is one thing 
they lack that SCC has, the status of an imported beer brand. By creating new product lines SCC 
would be no more in the risky position of “having all eggs in one basket” and could instead enter the 
upper segment without being under Cuca’s shadow.  
Why should Sagres be produced in Angola? 
After what was said about Sagres being exported to Angola there seems to be no relevant 
reasons to support the argument for transferring production and stop the transactions of the 
internationalization strategy of this brand in Angola. Even though, there could be some reasons for 
SCC to invest in the construction of a brewing factory in this country, they could produce other 
brands, this way taking advantage of its deep and vast experience in Angola and the relations 
established throughout all these years of presence in the country, grabbing also the opportunity to take 
the most of this potential and sui generis emerging market. 
Sagres targeting and positioning strategies – conclusion 
With these observations made, SCC would have enough reasons to believe that it wouldn’t be 
a good strategy to move the Sagres production to Angola again and deprive it from its core 
competitive advantage, which guarantees its successful position in this market. 
Sagres was perceived at this stage as a premium imported beer with a slightly higher price 
than Cuca and other local brands. It targets the middle segment described above, a middle-to-low 
income type of customer that is willing to pay a little extra for a better quality beer. The Sagres brand 
was positioned as a good quality brand accessible to the majority of customers, offering freshness and 
a smooth taste to its consumers. It has also been driving some attention through innovation, trying to 
satisfy these needs of Angolans who live in an extremely warm country, revealing the need of drinking 
beer as fresh as possible. SCC had been introducing several innovative concepts, along with its 
competitor Unicer, such as, the “mini” packaging system. 
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Having this in mind, SCC has to decide how to deal with the import tariff increase. It all 
depends on the positioning they want for Sagres. Whichever option SCC decides to follow, it would 
be crucial to be consistent and establish the Sagres brand positioning and also to assess the pros and 
cons of both alternatives concerning profitability. SCC could also opt to absorb just part of the tariff 
increase in its margins, and transfer the rest to the final price to the consumers, reinforcing its position 
as a premium imported beer and putting it at the same level of other successful imported brands, like 
Cristal and Super Bock. 
At the same time, with the information provided in this case it seems more likely that keeping 
the same positioning statement would be the right option, absorbing this way the tariffs increase on 
their margins, and continue its good performance fighting against Super Bock and Cuca, or even 
against Cristal with other Sagres product lines for example. Although, some consumer research would 
be helpful in order to take the most accurate possible decision. It is also important to keep in mind that 
the Sagres has a long presence in Angola and has created strong brand correlations in the consumers’ 
mind, and that these perceptions can be quite difficult and tricky to change in a successful way in a 
short period of time. A similar example of this is the Heineken case in USA. The Heineken Company 
has also kept exporting its core beer brand Heineken to USA and has never start producing in America 
regardless of the amount of beer being sold in that country. Similarly, they also found that what was 
driving consumers choice towards this brand was its place of origin and the fact that it was being 
imported. This positioning strategy not only distinguished Heineken from its competition but it also 
had established Heineken’s success in America.  
3rd Question 
If SCC decides to engage in foreign direct investment by starting to produce and sell a different brand of 
beer in Angola, how should this be positioned and targeted? Could there be a cannibalization problem? 
• This question should take 10 minutes to be discussed. This question should help students to rethink 
their analysis made on the previous question and see a broader picture of the Angola market and 
SCC’s future presence there. This question can also start a discussion on the feasibility of engaging 
in two simultaneous internationalization strategy procedures, through transactions and foreign 
direct investment.  
Besides being one of the most important countries in Africa, experiencing high levels of 
growth and being full of opportunities, Angola was still a difficult country for foreign companies to 
get established in. Investment options had to be carefully design and analyzed, because of the high 
level of risk, due to the country’s complex bureaucracy, political situation, corruption, and so on. It 
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wasn’t an easy place to get into, even if the path to succeed looked simple to achieve, it would always 
be difficult to predict how the outcome would be like in Angola. 
Regarding these opportunities and threats to invest in Angola, SCC seemed to take up a 
favorable position, compared to other companies of other countries, engaging in a foreign direct 
investment project, through their knowledge of the market and its way of functioning, and having 
already established valuable relationships with the local community and future local partners. With the 
financial support of its international partner, Heineken International, SCC would have a good chance 
of investing in the construction of a brewing plant in Angola, to produce and introduce other brands in 
this potential beer market. 
By analyzing the Angolan beer market, the competition present and with the information 
provided in this case study, it is possible to see various spaces to be conquered by SCC; in the lower 
and middle segments against Cuca; and if Sagres repositions itself in the middle segment closer to 
other imported brands (Super Bock and Cristal); and in the upper segment with new Sagres product 
categories.  
SCC could produce two different products to enter both these segments. They could start 
producing Cergal in Angola and position it at the lower segment competing with N’Gola and 33 
Export, with the lowest price in the market. And they could also introduce another beer to compete 
directly with Cuca, leaving the upper segment, and the upper part of the middle segment, to be 
conquered by the Sagres brand. This strategy would have the potentiality to enhance SCC’s overall 
profitability results and also to solve the issues resulting from the tariff increase that in the case of 
Cergal would be unbearable. 
In order to successfully design the strategy for both these brands, it would be very helpful for 
SCC to conduct a comprehensive market and consumer research, collecting the most accurate 
information possible about consumers needs and perceptions in these segments. This way SCC would 
be more likely to introduce a new beer and successfully steal some consumers from the leading brands 
Cuca and Nocal, improving its position in these segments. The Uppsala model that was previously 
analyzed, also suggests that the next internationalization step to be followed by SCC would be to start 
betting on foreign direct investment, continuing this way its progress in its overseas markets. 
International beer brands had entered Angola when local beer companies were still weak and didn’t 
have the production capacity to supply the entire Angolan market, a fact that has changed in the last 
decade, and Angolan beers represent 80% of the market in 2012. This investment of SCC in Angola 
would prepare the company to face future threats, guaranteeing its target of presence in Angola and 
also to continue collecting profits from this market. As an example, Cergal could be introduced in the 
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Angolan market by positioning itself as a Portuguese beer brand being produced in Angola with 
foreign components, offering a fresh and light taste, at the lowest price in the market.  
The cannibalization issue would also be important to consider in this case, where the 
introduction of a new brand in the same segment as Sagres could indeed steal some consumers from 
SCC. Market research would help minimize this obstacle by providing accurate information that 
would make it possible for the company to position its new brand adequately, competing directly with 
Cuca and/or Nocal. Regarding the lower entry brand Cergal it would not represent any threat, since 
neither SCC nor Heineken have a brand targeted to this segment. 
4th Question 
SCC was not yet present in Brazil. What would be the best way to enter this market? How should its 
product be positioned and targeted?  
• This question should be covered in 10 minutes. It aims to introduce students to the discussion of 
which internationalization strategy should be chosen to enter the Brazilian beer market. This 
question can easily be connected with the following one, by continuing to analyze the operational 
and strategic feasibility of introducing Sagres in Heineken’s beer portfolio in Brazil  
Ideally, and according to the Uppsala model, SCC should approach this new market through a 
transaction type of strategy, such as exports, targeting its beer to a niche segment that revealed the 
need/interest for this type of product. However, in this specific case, because exports could be quite 
difficult, due to the complex Brazilian taxation policy applied to imports, particularly of alcoholic 
beverages. 
As referred in the case study, the import tariff in Brazil would be above 150%, putting the 
beer price at an extremely high level, in the premium segment.  By entering this market with a product 
in the premium segment, SCC would enter into a direct competition with the largest international 
company in the beer industry, AB-Inbev, which had a 70% market share in this highly segmented and 
diversified market. With such high taxes on imports, the option of absorbing the entire, or even part, of 
the tariffs in order to maintain a lower price, would be completely out of reach because it wouldn’t 
leave any profit for SCC. 
Having been acquired by the 4th largest beer company in the world, SCC can finally hope to 
see one of its brands entering the Brazilian market. The Portuguese Heineken subsidiary had in Brazil 
the opportunity to start producing one of its brands of beer in the Heineken brewing plants. This 
strategy, also a transaction type of internationalization strategy through licensing, would be of great 
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advantage to SCC, representing an extremely low cost internationalization process, and offering the 
opportunity for SCC to sell its beer to the Portuguese community living in that country and generate 
profits to help sustain operations in Portugal. The only issue remaining to take this internationalization 
strategy forward is to put in place an agreement with Heineken to introduce another beer brand in its 
Brazilian portfolio. More specifically, in order to integrate a new beer brand in Heineken’s 
infrastructure it is first necessary to assess the company’s production capacity and distribution pipeline 
availability to know if this process would be feasible and would not interfere with Heineken’s 
performance or future plans. It would also be necessary for SCC to make sure all potential demand 
could be satisfied. 
Regarding the choice of which brands to launch in Brazil, it should probably be the one that is 
better known by the Portuguese community residing the country. In such a highly segmented market 
SCC should bring a brand of beer to fulfill the needs of this type of consumer, which is better known. 
Taking this into account, it would be the basic line of the Sagres brand to be introduced in Brazil, 
keeping the original recipe and everything else, in order to assure that expectations are met. The price 
should be low but within the mainstream segment, without placing it in the low cost segment. 
5th Question 
Could a Portuguese beer brand adequately fit the Heineken Brazil beer portfolio? Justify. 
• The discussion around this question should last around 10 minutes. In this question the lecturer 
could start by asking students about their opinion of introducing Sagres in the Heineken’s portfolio 
and if it would be strategically in touch with the company’s international priorities. Then, students 
should be questioned if they could find a way to help them predict if it would be possible to 
physically integrate Sagres in Heineken’s production capacity, with the information made available 
in the case. 
From a strategic point of view, the introduction of the Sagres brand in Heineken’s portfolio 
seems to be perfectly in line with the company’s strategy, goals and priorities. This new launch in the 
Brazilian market would not only be important for SCC, but it would also contribute to Heinken’s 
objective of creating a comprehensive and effective beer portfolio, composed by international beers, 
local beers, and beers with connection to the country of destination. In Brazil Heineken was faced by a 
highly segmented and complex market, where its major competitor AB-Inbev was playing a 
devastating role, leaving little space for other companies to grow. With Sagres, Heineken would 
actually be able to reach a significant niche segment, through a distinctive approach, fulfilling the 
strong needs connected with Portuguese tradition and culture, that were observed in this country. This 
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internationalization process could bring advantages for Heineken not only in the Brazilian market but 
it could also be crucial to improve its performance in Portugal and in the European markets. 
In the operational perspective, it was only needed to evaluate the feasibility of adding another 
product to the current production capacity Heineken had and investigate if the existing distribution 
infrastructures would suit Sagres brand purposes and reach its consumers. After acquiring FEMSA’s 
beer sector, Heineken has seen itself well implemented in the Brazilian market, possessing some 
famous local and international beer brands, which represented 8,5% of the total market. Besides 
appearing small compared to AB-Inbev, Heineken was in 2012 controlling a large and valuable beer 
portfolio, owning eight production plants in seven different states, forming a total production capacity 
of 20 million hectoliters, and a well established distribution pipeline to the numerous selling points in 
Brazil. It is possible to have a rough idea with the information provided in the case about the 
feasibility of incorporating the production of Sagres in the Heineken’s Brazil available production 
capacity. It is known that the total beer production in Brazil is around 114 million hectoliters, so: 
Actual Heineken’s beer production = Total production in Brazil x Heineken’s market share 
                                                           = 114 x 0,085 = 9,69 million hectoliters 
Despite this calculation not being all that close to the reality, it gives us an idea about the 
viability of this process. The results suggest that not even half of the potential production capacity is 
being utilized by the company. It seems possible to add Sagres production in the infrastructures 
available in this country. Thus, it would be only a matter of assessing the distribution procedures in the 
meeting that SCC and Heineken had scheduled for the end of 2012. 
6th Question 
Would both these specific internationalization projects of SCC be advantageous for Heineken, or could 
it actually bring some damages/constraints to the group, such as cannibalization? 
• This question can be easily discussed in 10 minutes in which students are encouraged to give their 
opinion about the consequences of both internationalization projects on the Heineken’s overall 
performance and results, according to the strategies discussed in the previous questions. 
	  
After analyzing both internationalization options individually, there would be some evidence 
about the benefits and potentialities available in each country. In both these countries there seems to 
be a positive scenario for SCC to improve and expand its operations, being able to compensate the loss 
of volume in Portugal and even increasing the company’s profits through an expanded performance in 
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international markets. The first argument to support the idea that both these internationalization 
projects would be advantageous for Heineken is based on the fact of SCC being 100% owned by this 
large international group, meaning that all the positive outcomes achieved by SCC would directly and 
equally contribute for the Heineken group itself. The only counterargument regarding this theory 
would be the case of SCC interfering with the performance of other Heineken subsidiaries in one of 
these countries. A way this could happen would be for instance through cannibalization, which 
consists in the case of SCC’s products stealing sales volume from another of Heineken’s brand. 
Despite this threat being excluded in the case of Angola, taking into account that Heineken had no 
other brands besides those of SCC in this country, and in the Brazilian case it would be necessary to 
have this issue in mind. 
Having SCC as a representative operating in both these specific markets with its own 
Portuguese brands, would also give Heineken some other advantages, such as, the relationship and 
connections established between Portugal and former colonies Angola and Brazil, as well as, its 
marked legacy and language. 
Through the presence of SCC in Angola, Heineken would have the opportunity to consolidate 
its presence in the African continent. Heineken was already present in several countries in Africa, 
Nigeria being its principal market and the second largest beer market in Africa. Angola was in 2012 
one of the most important and rapidly developing countries in Africa, where beer consumption was 
rising considerably mainly due to the increasing GDP. By supporting SCC to enhance its presence in 
this market through the international alternatives considered, including the construction of a brewing 
plant, Heineken would not only attain more profits in Angola and extend its market share in Africa, 
but it would also help SCC to reduce costs and sustain its operations in Portugal. Having referred to 
the main advantages of Heineken by entering this market, there are also some significant 
disadvantages to consider in this specific case. The biggest one is the high initial investment needed to 
accomplish the company’s internationalization objectives and continue to improve its performance in 
Angola. The high investment risk in this country makes this issue even more inconvenient for 
Heineken, as well as being difficult to predict the exact investment needed and its respective outcome. 
Looking at Brazil, Heineken’s main advantage in this country through the integration of a 
Portuguese beer brand would be to conquer a niche market, composed of the Portuguese community, 
and possibly still some consumers from its biggest competitor AB-Inbev, by using a distinct approach 
to market. Integrating this Portuguese beer brand in the Brazilian portfolio would reinforce Heineken’s 
international strategy and would also be in line with its priorities of building a strong portfolio of local 
beer brands and powerful international beer brands. This project actually had the potential to win 
Heineken some shares in the Brazilian market and consequently increasing its profits in this country. 
Besides the difficulty to predict, the biggest disadvantage Heineken could have through this process 
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would be the cannibalization of its own sales with the introduction of the Sagres brand. In order to 
deal with this issue, Heineken could develop some research on consumer insights to know what type 
of consumer the brand should target and to have a better picture of its positioning statement in this 
market. This procedure would also give the company an idea about the influence of the Sagres brand 
on its sales and make it possible for Heineken to decide on its feasibility. Another possible 
disadvantage could be to integrate Sagres in its current production capacity and distribution channels, 
although the information provided in the case study suggests that this issue would never be a real 
problem at this stage, even without having accurate evidence about the potential reach of this brand. 
7th Question 
Identify some pros and cons of the two internationalization strategy categories – “foreign direct 
investment” and “transactions”? Try to illustrate with the case. 
•  This question aims to test students on the knowledge acquired regarding two different 
internationalization categories, giving some case examples to illustrate some pros and cons for each 
category. This question should take no more than 10 minutes to be covered.  
There are several ways companies could follow in order to internationalize their operations. 
According to Adriano Freire’s book, Estratégia – Sucesso em Portugal	   (12th	   edition,	   2008) these 
internationalization procedures can be grouped into three different categories: transactions, foreign 
direct investments and projects. In this case only the first two will be analyzed.  
Transactions cover the marketing of goods, services, patents and brands of a specific company 
to foreign companies. In this case internationalization is restricted to the exchange of company’s 
competencies from a local to a foreign market. Exports and licensing are examples of this category. 
This was the type of internationalization category implemented in Angola through beer exports and in 
Brazil by licensing the introduction of Sagres brand in the Heineken portfolio. 
Foreign direct investment is observed when a company performs part, or all, of the 
operational activities in an external market. This process not only requires a company to transfer its 
operational practices to the external market, but also to develop its vertical integration. Examples of 
this type of internationalization are joint-ventures and subsidiaries. Projects of this kind were the ones 
planned for Angola through the construction of a brewing plant to produce beer for this country. 
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The main internationalization strategy options to be considered in a specific country, should 
then narrow down its set of alternatives by considering factors such as, (a) the legal framing in the 
foreign country; (b) the access to that particular market; (c) the experience and knowledge acquired 
about it; (d) the competition; (e) the potential existing risks (exchange rates, political instability, 
cultural differences); (f) the level of control on its brand, technology, operations, costs, etc; (g) return 
and profitability issues; (h) the asset’s physical characteristics; (i) related costs of each option; (j) 
resources and raw materials availability; and, (k) the products characteristics themselves.36  
 
Some of the pros and cons for each internationalization strategy are illustrated in TN Exhibit 8 
and TN Exhibit 9: 
 




• Gain knowledge and experience in an 
external market 
• Low level of risk 
• Good connotations with the country of 
origin of the product or service 
• Reduced investment costs 
• Increased sales volumes 
• More brand notoriety in external markets 
• Increased profitability in the long run due    
to reduced level of operation investments 
• Import tariff influence on pricing and 
profitability 
• Administration and transportation costs 
• Lack of control in the distribution process          
and quality of service delivered 
• Risk of brand image being neglected on              
a long term basis 
• Lower financial returns 
• Reduced competitiveness 
• Bad connotations with the country of 
origin of the product or service  
• Dependency on local agents and suppliers 
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• Control of service and distribution quality 
• More flexibility and control on prices      
and operational costs 
• Scale economies related benefits 
• Support to surrounding regions subsidiaries 
• No cost with import tariffs 
• Exploit all the advantages of the its 
integrated performance in the foreign 
market 
• Complexity and moroseness of the process 
• High investment risk 
• Bureaucracy and legal framing 
• Change customers perceptions                             
and/or brand image 
• Not advisable as a first approach to an         
external market 
• Sharing profits with local partners 
• Difficulty in adapting to local management 
practices and local consumers 
Source: Case writer 
8th Question 
Is it possible two identify a better international expansion alternative for SCC to follow between the two 
presented in the case? Justify. 
• This last question can help the lecturer to wrap up the discussion and make a summary of the 
objectives and learning points of this case. It can easily be done in 5 minutes. Some last overall 
opinions would be useful in case there is still some time left to do so.  
Regarding the alternatives the company had to approach these distinctive markets, it was clear 
that Angola would easily be more costly than Brazil. In the first case, SCC was in a certain way being 
forced to engage in foreign direct investment in the country, while in the second one it had the 
opportunity to take advantage of its parent company having already an implanted infrastructure in 
Brazil. There were also appeared to be more obstacles and risks in Angola than in Brazil regarding the 
alternatives considered and their respective levels of investment.  
However, it can still be quite difficult to consider one internationalization option better than 
the other. To support this theory we know that SCC and Heineken had different objectives in each 
country. In Angola the goal was to increase sales volumes in order to maintain the company’s 
infrastructures in Portugal, and at the same time enhance and guarantee the company’s stake in the 
country. In Brazil, where SCC was not yet present, the main goal was to conquer profits through the 
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Sagres brand in order to help the Heineken subsidiary in Portugal. Knowing this, it is possible that it 
could be somehow more difficult to measure which project could help the most the company as a 
whole, in both short-term and long-term perspectives. Also the internationalization phase is different, 
as mentioned in Learning in the Internationalisation Process of Firms, companies should have distinctive 
and specific approaches to each country, depending on their knowledge and experience in the markets, 
having at the beginning a lower level of risk, commitment and investments, and increasing gradually 
according to the existing opportunities. Angola, where SCC has been present for a long time, and 
Brazil, where SCC was not present yet, can clearly illustrate this approach pattern and the different 
internationalization phases of companies to expand into external markets. 
With the analysis made through all of the previous questions, it was possible to infer that both 
these markets would have a great usefulness for both the Heineken Company and its subsidiary SCC. 
The two of them revealed to possess a greater potential for both companies to effectively accomplish 
their goals and reinforce their international vision. 
2.8 What Has Happened? 
At the time of the preparation of this case study, in December 2012, SCC had revealed some 
ideas about the next steps towards its future presence in both these markets. 
Regarding Angola, it was agreed that Sagres should continue as an imported brand, and that 
the current strategy should be maintained as long as possible, knowing that it has allowed attaining 
good results for the company and helping the situation in Portugal. However, the construction of a 
brewing plant in Angola was already fully planned and ready to go, just waiting for the right moment 
to be put into practice. The place for the factory and the local partner had already been chosen, as well 
as, the brand, or brands, to be produced. All these strategies and decisions considered in Angola were 
based on comprehensive market research done by the company, which was not revealed to the case 
writer, as well as the conclusions attained from it.  
Concerning SCC’s expansion in Brazil, it was clear that the only and better option would be to 
produce Sagres in one of Heineken’s facilities. The only issue to be decided was the terms of an 
agreement regarding production capacity and distribution pipeline management, and it was expected to 
start as soon as possible. 
 
	  
	  
 
